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ABSTRACT 
 
Testing the Affect Model of Social Comparison (AMSC): Emotional and Behavioral 
Implications of Viewers’ Shifting Comparisons to Transforming Media Targets  
 
by 
 
Lauren Keblusek 
 
Past research on social comparison and media has not explored how comparisons shift over 
the course of a program, or more specifically, how different comparison directions alter 
audiences’ affective states and behavior.  Using an experimental design that manipulated 
comparison direction by exposing participants to the beginning and/or the ending of a weight 
loss reality program, the present study found mixed support for a newly proposed Affect 
Model of Social Comparison (AMSC).  As predicted, different comparison directions 
contributed to specific emotions and health behaviors.  Those who made more upward health 
comparisons felt more envy, which in turn contributed to increased health behavioral intent.  
Hope was also identified as an indirect mediator in the upward health comparison-health 
behavioral intent relationship.  Further, upward comparisons led individuals to consume 
more healthy snacks, and downward comparisons led individuals to consume more unhealthy 
snacks.  This experiment indexes the importance of discrete emotions in social comparison 
processes, and highlights the need for research on nuanced comparison behavior that evolves 
as characters evolve.
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Testing the Affect Model of Social Comparison (AMSC): Emotional and behavioral 
Implications of Viewers’ Shifting Comparisons to Transforming Media Targets 
Social comparisons help us make sense of a complex social world and our place 
within it.  Given that our personal identity and sense of self are at stake, it is understandable 
that we regularly compare ourselves with those around us, including media figures.  We 
sometimes make downward comparisons to worse-off media figures, thinking about how our 
lives are better than those depicted onscreen.  We can also make upward comparisons to 
better-off media figures we admire or envy.  These comparisons help us assess our relative 
standing and strive for improvement when possible.  
We know from extant literature that comparisons lead to a range of psychological and 
behavioral outcomes.  Studies involving media and body image generally indicate that 
upward comparisons to thin media targets contribute to boy dissatisfaction (Jones, 2001; 
Morrison, Kalin, & Morrison, 2004; Agliata & Tantleff-Dunn, 2004; Botta, 1999; Cattarin, 
Thompson, Thomas, & Williams, 2000; Hawkins, Richards, Granley, & Stein, 2004; 
Tiggemann & McGill, 2004) and disordered eating (Botta, 1999; Harrison & Cantor, 1997).  
However, while we know that upward comparisons to media figures can shape our feelings 
and actions, the important connection between comparison-induced emotions and subsequent 
health behavior remains understudied, particularly in the context of downward comparisons.   
We also very little about message-specific features in media-based social comparison 
processes.  Past studies have typically considered social comparison to a media message or 
character in general, and some assume that comparisons are occurring without explicitly 
measuring them.  When researchers ask viewers if they made comparisons during a program, 
or simply show them a picture of a model, we may not know the specific comparison target, 
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the domain and direction of comparison, or when comparisons took place.  Refinement here 
would be highly instructive to gain a fuller understanding of the comparisons occurring, and 
to account for the dynamic nature of media messages—the fact that these messages often 
feature transitional characters that change over time.  
 To address these gaps in media and social comparison research, the present study had 
two major goals: 1) to examine the connection between emotional arousal and subsequent 
health behaviors in the context of both upward and downward comparisons, and 2) to 
examine comparisons to transitional characters that change over the course of a program.  To 
meet these goals, an experiment was conducted to test a newly proposed model of social 
comparison, emotion, and health behavior—the Affect Model of Social Comparison 
(AMSC).  The AMSC model is the first to address the emotional and behavioral implications 
of viewers’ shifting comparisons to evolving media targets.  The model was tested in the 
context of a weight loss reality television program, where social comparisons to a specific 
transitional character were measured at different points in the program.  This context was 
chosen because a transformational reality program has the potential to prompt viewers to 
make both upward and downward comparisons.  Ultimately, this paper argues that the 
comparison target, direction, domain, and time of comparison matter, as they differentially 
impact the audience’s psychological and behavioral responses to a media stimulus.  
Social Comparison Theory 
 Social comparison theory explains how, in the absence of objective information about 
our performance (such as IQ), we compare ourselves to somewhat similar others to gain a 
more accurate conception of our relative standing in a self-relevant domain—a domain 
relevant to our personal identity (Festinger, 1954).  Indeed, research suggests that 
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comparison targets tend to be similar to ourselves in certain demographic attributes, 
including ethnicity and gender, as these comparisons are likely most informative for 
individuals making comparisons (see Meisel & Blumberg, 1990; Zanna, Goethals, & Hill, 
1975).  We make comparisons to those we perceive as better off than ourselves in certain 
areas (upward social comparisons) and those we perceive as worse-off in other areas 
(downward social comparisons) to determine the upper and lower skill boundaries and assess 
our relative standing in a domain of interest (Gruder, 1971;Wheeler, 1969).  According to 
Festinger (1954), the primary motivation for social comparison behavior is the drive for an 
accurate self-assessment of abilities.  However, later theorists and researchers recognized that 
a variety of other motives could drive comparison behavior, including the need for self-
enhancement and self-improvement (Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995).  The self-
improvement motive suggests that we make upward comparisons to see how we can improve 
in a self-relevant domain, and the self-enhancement motive suggests that we compare 
downward to maintain positive self-esteem in the face of threat.  As we will see in the 
coming section, both upward and downward comparisons lead to a variety of discrete 
emotions. 
Social Comparison and Emotion 
 
Depending upon the subject’s cognitive appraisals of a comparison—such as his 
perceived attainability of success in the upward comparison domain or perceived 
susceptibility of future failure in the downward comparison domain—both upward and 
downward comparisons can be seen as either empowering or discouraging, leading to either 
positive or negative affective states (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van Yperen, & Dakof, 1990).  
Upward comparisons in self-relevant domains have been shown to lead to self-reported envy 
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(De Steno & Salovey, 1996; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Tesser & Collins, 1988) and 
unhappiness (Tesser & Collins, 1988).  In line with this, Tesser’s self-evaluation 
maintenance (SEM) model of social behavior suggests that unfavorable upward comparisons 
result in negative affect that we seek to reduce or avoid, as the discrepancy between self and 
target exposes our deficiencies and shortcomings (Tesser 1988, 1991).  In general, negative 
feelings of self-deflation and demoralization are likely when the comparison domain is 
perceived to be unattainable, because this means that the individual’s worse-off position is 
unlikely to change (Lockwood & Kunda, 2000; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).  Note that while 
it is often true that negative emotions result when we feel that we cannot attain our goals, we 
will see in the coming text that envy is an exception, for this negative emotion can occur 
under conditions of high perceived attainability.  
In contrast, when our goal of success in an upward comparison domain seems 
attainable, we are more likely to experience positive emotions.  For instance, research 
suggests that when individuals perceive physical attractiveness to be attainable, they 
experience more positive affective responses to ideal media targets (Knobloch-Westerwick & 
Romero, 2011).  Similarly, when becoming thin seems attainable rather than unobtainable, 
individuals feel less anxious and experience less negative affect following media-based 
comparisons (Mills, Polivy, Herman, & Tiggeman, 2002).  When a self-relevant comparison 
domain is deemed attainable, upward comparisons can also lead to positive emotions such as 
hope, by demonstrating that success is possible and by inspiring individuals to strive for 
improvement (Buunk, Kuyper, & Van der Zee, 2005; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Collins, 
1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997, 2000; Taylor & Lobel, 1989).  Hope is presumably most 
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likely to result when individuals are driven by a self-improvement motive, making 
comparisons to learn from superior others. 
Whereas upward comparisons contribute to positive or negative affect based upon 
perceived attainability of success in the comparison domain, downward comparisons can lead 
to positive or negative affect depending upon one’s perceived susceptibility, or fear of 
becoming similar to the worse-off comparison target in the future.  Research suggests that 
downward comparisons can improve mood (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989) and self-esteem 
(Reis, Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1993), particularly among low self-esteem subjects.  Indeed, self-
relevant downward comparisons can lead to feelings of pride and happiness by highlighting 
one’s superior abilities (Tesser & Collins, 1988; Willis, 1981), particularly when 
accompanied by perceptions of low susceptibility of becoming worse off in the future.  
However, downward comparisons can also lead to negative affect by demonstrating how 
one’s plight may become similar to the worse-off target in the future—how one’s goals of 
success in the target domain may be threatened or thwarted in the future.  Indeed, downward 
comparisons coupled with these perceptions of high susceptibility have been shown to lead to 
feelings of fear and worry (Buunk et al., 2005).  Overall, it is clear that emotions matter in 
social comparison processes, but they have not been integrated systematically into the social 
comparison literature.  We turn to Richard Lazarus’ (1991a) cognitive-motivational-
relational theory of emotion next, which explains that social comparisons contribute to 
specific emotions, which in turn lead to specific behaviors.  
Lazarus’ Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory of Emotion 
Lazarus’ cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion maintains that each 
emotion is associated with a specific, characteristic pattern of cognitive appraisals of the 
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person-environment relationship.  Appraisals are shaped by environmental constraints and 
personal beliefs and motives (1991a, 1991b).  According to the theory, there are three 
primary appraisals relating to one’s goals.  The first, goal relevance, involves whether a goal 
is currently at stake.  If more important goals are implicated, we feel emotions more intensely 
(Lazarus, 1991b).  The second, ego-involvement, revolves around whether or not one’s self-
esteem, status, or wellbeing is implicated in the situation (Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b).  The third 
goal-based appraisal, goal congruency/incongruency, involves whether the goal is being 
achieved or is being thwarted—in other words, whether a situation is seen as threatening or 
beneficial.  Threatening situations tend to lead to negative emotions, whereas beneficial 
situations tend to lead to positive emotions (Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b).   
Lazarus’ cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion includes three other 
secondary appraisals, which involve coping processes.  Coping potential consists of one’s 
perceived ability to cope with threats in the environment to improve this environment, and 
future expectations involve one’s perception of whether things will change for better or 
worse in the future (Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b).  Finally, individuals make credit/blame 
appraisals, in which perceived credit or blame for beneficial or threatening situations are 
assigned, individuals consider whether this credit or blame was directed toward themselves 
or others, and they assess their perceived control over the situation (Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b).   
Beyond appraisals, the second major component of Lazarus’ theory is the link 
between specific discrete emotions and specific actions.  Lazarus (1991a) asserts that each 
emotion leads to specific action tendencies or “biological urges” (p.229).  (See Figure 1 for 
action tendencies associated with each emotion).  This emotion-action link has been widely 
recognized.  Indeed, evolutionary-based scholars concur that emotions motivate action—
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different arousal states lead to “approach” or “avoidance” action tendencies meant to aid us 
in survival and reproduction by altering the source of our arousal physically or mentally 
(Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991a; Plutchik, 1982).  
Integrating Emotion into Social Comparison Theory 
We know from the social comparison literature that attainability and susceptibility are 
important variables to consider in social comparison research.  Further, we understand from 
Lazarus’ cognitive-motivational-relational theory that emotions result from patterns of 
cognitive appraisals, and that each emotion leads to a different action tendency.  Combining 
these two theories will allow us to better understand which emotions are likely to be evoked, 
and what actions are likely to be taken following upward and downward comparisons, 
respectively.  
As a first step, let us consider how social comparison theory might relate to Lazarus’ 
emotion appraisals, generally speaking.  Goal relevance is always cued when we engage in 
social comparisons because we make comparisons in self-relevant domains.  Appraisals of 
ego involvement generally accompany social comparisons, because we tend to make 
comparisons in self-relevant domains and often engage in comparisons to improve our self-
esteem and enhance our relative status in the comparison domain.  Appraisals of goal 
congruence or incongruence vary based on the specific comparison situation and determine 
whether the comparison-induced emotion is positive or negative.  Negative emotions 
generally result from goal-incongruent comparison situations (in which our goals are seen as 
threatened), whereas positive emotions generally result from goal-congruent comparison 
situations (in which our goals are seen as being attained).  Finally, appraisals of coping 
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potential, future expectations, and credit/blame vary based upon the comparison situation, 
and ultimately shape the specific comparison-induced emotions that we feel.   
In the present discussion, two of the aforementioned coping appraisals are likely most 
important: coping potential (i.e., perceived ability to cope with threats in the environment), 
and future expectations (i.e., whether things will change for better or worse in the future).  
These appraisals are most important for us because they can be linked with perceived 
attainability of success and perceived susceptibility of failure in the comparison domain.  If 
we can map perceived susceptibility and attainability onto some of Lazarus’ emotion 
appraisals, we will be in a position to predict the specific comparison-induced emotions that 
individuals might feel.   
Attainability is linked to coping potential as both involve an assessment of our ability 
to take action to reverse a threatening person-environment relationship and improve our 
relative standing in the domain of interest.  Attainability is also linked to future expectations, 
for our expectations of the future are shaped by whether or not we feel that our goals can 
indeed be reached in the future.  When perceived attainability is high, coping potential is 
favorable and future expectations are favorable—we do not believe that our current 
unfavorable situation will persist in the future.  When perceived attainability is low, coping 
potential is likely unfavorable or uncertain—we believe that the unfavorable situation may 
persist because we cannot attain success in the upward comparison domain.  Future 
expectations are likely more negative or uncertain under conditions of low attainability, 
because individuals do not believe that the goal-incongruent situation will be ameliorated in 
the future.  
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Perceived susceptibility can also be mapped onto appraisals of coping potential, for 
when we feel susceptible to becoming worse-off, we are experiencing a threatening person-
environment situation with which we may or may not be able to cope.  Susceptibility is 
related to future expectations as both consist of perceiving future threat.  When perceived 
susceptibility is low—when we believe that we are and will remain better off—coping 
potential is irrelevant because the situation is already favorable.  Future expectations are 
favorable because we believe that the situation will remain positive in the future.  When 
perceived susceptibility is high, coping potential could be favorable, unfavorable, or 
uncertain.  Expectations for the future are generally negative or uncertain under conditions of 
high susceptibility, as we fear that things might become worse in the future.  
Given all of this, we see that perceptions of attainability and susceptibility—
important variables in social comparison research—map onto Lazarus’ (1991a) appraisals of 
coping potential and future expectations.  These appraisals can be used to predict specific 
emotions resulting from upward and downward comparisons.  Indeed, using appraisals to 
predict emotions resulting from comparisons is one major goal of the proposed Affect Model 
of Social Comparison (AMSC).   
The other major goal of the model is to predict the actions individuals will take based 
upon the discrete emotions that they feel, using Lazarus’ theory and the action tendencies he 
proposes for each emotion.  Applying Lazarus’ (1991a, 1991b) perspective, we can reason 
that appraisals of coping potential are linked to action following social comparisons.  
Behavior change is most likely when coping potential is favorable—when we feel that we 
can take action to reverse a threatening comparison and restore positive affect.  Thus, we will 
term emotions with high coping potential corrective emotions, because these emotions 
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generally drive us to act to correct our unfavorable relative status.  Conversely, behavior 
change is least likely when reversing the negative situation seems impossible (when coping 
potential is unfavorable or uncertain) or when the situation is already favorable and coping 
potential is unnecessary.  We will call emotions with unfavorable, uncertain, or unnecessary 
coping potential non-corrective emotions, as these emotions generally do not prompt us to 
take action to improve our comparative status.   
Consistent with the discussion above, Tesser’s (1988) Self-Evaluation Maintenance 
(SEM) model of social behavior helps further explain the emotion-action link by positing that 
unfavorable comparisons often lead to negative affect that we seek to reduce in a number of 
ways, including by engaging in status-improving behaviors (Tesser, 1988, 1991).  Thus, 
according to the SEM model, when making unfavorable comparisons we will be motivated to 
engage in behaviors to reduce the discrepancy between self and target, which will improve 
self-esteem and restore positive affect.  Stated differently, corrective emotions (which tend to 
be negative emotions) lead to action that will replace the negative affect with more positive 
affect.   The emotion-action link has also been acknowledged in the media literature—for 
example, envy and hope have been found to mediate the relationship between social 
comparisons and intentions to undergo cosmetic procedures in the context of reality 
makeover programs (Nabi & Keblusek, 2014).  
Overall, we propose that while appraisals of coping potential and future expectations 
help determine the emotions we feel, coping potential (along with the action tendency 
associated with the emotion aroused) determines whether or not we will take action to 
improve our comparative status.  These appraisals form the backbone of the Affect Model of 
Social Comparison (AMSC), which will be further elucidated below.  
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The Affect Model of Social Comparison (AMSC) 
The Affect Model of Social Comparison integrates social comparison theory with 
Lazarus’ emotion appraisal perspective to make predictions regarding the emotions 
individuals will feel, and the actions they will likely take following upward and downward 
comparisons, respectively.  Four possible comparison scenarios define the four branches of 
the AMSC model (see Figure 2a).  Each scenario, along with likely resulting emotions and 
actions, will be outlined in the coming text (see Figure 1 for a chart of Lazarus’ discrete 
emotion typology, including appraisals and action tendencies associated with each emotion).   
Upward Comparisons and High Attainability.  The first possible scenario, upward 
comparisons paired with high attainability, is a scenario in which an individual is worse off 
than the comparison target but perceives he can become better off in the future, as when an 
individual compares upward to a thinner and healthier individual, but knows that he can 
exercise and eat healthy to become thinner and more physically fit in the future.  Upward 
comparisons paired with perceptions of high attainability results in goal-incongruence (e.g. 
negative affect) because one’s goal of success in the target domain is threatened by the 
existence of a more successful other.  Coping potential is positive in this situation, because 
individuals feel that their goals can be obtained, thereby improving the presently threatening 
situation.  Similarly, future expectations are somewhat positive because the threatening goal-
incongruent situation will likely be reversed in the future.  
Emotions that fit the aforementioned pattern of appraisals include envy and (to a 
lesser extent) hope (Lazarus, 1991a, see Figure 1).  Because coping potential is generally 
favorable for envy and hope, these emotions are deemed corrective emotions that will 
motivate action meant to reduce the threat caused by the unfavorable upward comparison.  
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Presumably, that action would be targeted toward improving one’s status in the comparison 
domain, such as exercising and dieting to become healthier. 
Upward Comparisons and Low Attainability.  The second scenario, upward 
comparisons paired with low attainability, arises for individuals who are worse off than the 
comparison target but do not believe that their inferior status can improve in the future.  This 
might include an individual who compares upward to a thinner individual, but does not 
believe he can ever attain a similar weight due to a chronic medical condition resulting in 
weight gain.  This individual does not feel as though action steps can be taken to lose weight 
due to his medical condition.  This is a goal-incongruent, negative emotion-eliciting scenario 
because the individual’s goal of success in the target domain is threatened by the existence of 
a better-off comparison target whose success he can never obtain.  In this situation, coping 
potential is negative or uncertain because the individual does not believe that he can reverse 
the threatening situation and attain his goals, and future expectations are negative or 
uncertain because he believes things will not improve in the future.   
Emotions that fit this appraisal pattern include sadness and anxiety (Lazarus, 1991a, 
see Figure 1).  Sadness and anxiety are associated with unfavorable and uncertain coping 
potential, respectively.  Because sad and anxious individuals generally do not feel as though 
they can take action to cope with the threat in their environment, we deem these non-
corrective emotions.  Individuals experiencing sadness and anxiety are unlikely to take action 
to improve their status in the upward comparison domain because restorative action seems 
impossible.  They will not be inspired to diet and exercise to lose weight and become more 
fit, even after comparing themselves with healthier others.  
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Downward Comparisons and High Susceptibility.  The third scenario, downward 
comparisons paired with high susceptibility, is one in which individuals are currently better 
off, comparatively speaking, but fear that they could become worse off in the future.  An 
example might be a middle-aged woman who begins thinking about how her health might 
decline soon, as she ages.  When she compares herself with elderly women, she is better off 
in terms of health and fitness now, but fears that she soon will not be.  This is a goal-
incongruent (and hence negative emotion-inducing) scenario because fear of becoming 
similar to the worse-off other in the future threatens to thwart one’s goals of success.  In this 
case, coping potential can be positive, negative, or uncertain depending upon whether or not 
one feels that the future threat can be prevented.  Future expectations are negative or 
uncertain, because the individual perceives that she will become worse-off in the future.   
Emotions that fit this pattern of appraisals include hope (when future threat can be 
prevented; i.e. when coping potential is somewhat favorable), sadness (when future threat 
cannot be prevented; i.e. when coping potential is unfavorable), and anxiety (when future 
threat cannot be prevented; i.e. when coping potential is uncertain).   Hope is associated with 
somewhat favorable coping potential, so it is deemed a corrective emotion that will drive 
action meant to prevent future threat in the downward comparison domain (for example, 
exercising and eating healthier to protect oneself from becoming heavier and unhealthier in 
the future).  Sadness and anxiety are deemed non-corrective emotions because coping 
potential is unfavorable (for sadness) or uncertain (for anxiety).  Feeling as though they 
cannot take action to reverse the present unfavorable situation, individuals feeling sad or 
anxious are unlikely to act to help prevent the perceived future threat of deteriorating health.  
 	  
14 
Downward Comparisons and Low Susceptibility.  The final scenario, downward 
comparisons paired with low susceptibility, is one in which the individual is and believes he 
will remain better off than a worse off comparison target.  We can envision a situation in 
which a highly thin, fit person who exercises regularly compares himself to a heavier, less fit 
other.  The fit individual does not think that becoming unhealthy is a possibility due to the 
fact that he is young and has been healthy all his life, and due to the action steps he currently 
takes to remain healthy—he exercises regularly and eats exclusively healthy foods.  This is a 
goal-congruent (and hence positive affect-inducing) scenario because the goal of success in 
the target domain has already been achieved and the success will likely persist.  Coping 
potential is unnecessary because one does not need to “cope” with the situation—it is already 
favorable and need not be altered.  Future expectations are generally positive, because the 
individual believes the situation is and will likely remain favorable in the future.   
Emotions that fit this appraisal pattern include pride, happiness, and compassion.  
Coping potential is unnecessary for all of the aforementioned emotions, rendering them non-
corrective, meaning they are unlikely to inspire action meant to maintain superior standing in 
the downward comparison domain.  In the absence of a perceived threat, no action is 
necessary—these individuals are unlikely to adopt a more rigorous exercise or diet plan to 
maintain their superior status in domains of fitness and health. 
We tested the AMSC model in the context of a weight loss reality program. 
Ultimately, we considered two of the four possible scenarios—those deemed most likely in a 
health context.  Because there is likely a bias toward high attainability and low susceptibility 
in domains involving fitness, especially among healthy young people, upward comparisons 
paired with high attainability and downward comparisons paired with low susceptibility will 
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be explored.  Because the model will be applied in a media context, we now turn to research 
on social comparison and media, highlighting limitations that we seek to address.   
Social Comparison and Media 
In the media effects literature, research on social comparison largely appears within 
the context of body image and exposure to thin, ideal media models.  Studies generally 
explore the relationship between media-based comparisons and subsequent behaviors, 
feelings, and attitudes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, upward comparisons to ideal media targets 
have been shown to adversely influence body-related attitudes.  For instance, after making 
upward comparisons to ideal media targets, individuals are more likely to support attitudes 
and behaviors associated with eating disorders (Hawkins et al., 2004).  Upward comparisons 
to media targets also contribute to negative affective states.  While results are not entirely 
consistent (see Knobloch-Westerwick & Crane, 2012), a plethora of studies indicate that 
upward comparisons to ideal media targets are associated with both males’ and females’ 
general body dissatisfaction (Jones, 2001; Morrison, Kalin, & Morrison, 2004; Agliata & 
Tantleff-Dunn, 2004; Botta, 1999; Cattarin et al., 2000; Hawkins, Richards, Granley, & 
Stein, 2004; Tiggemann & McGill, 2004).  Beyond body dissatisfaction, upward media-
based comparisons can contribute to a variety of other negative affective states in women 
including anxiety, depression, anger, and lowered self-esteem (Hawkins et al., 2004; Cattarin 
et al., 2000), and depressive mood in men (Agliata & Tantleff-Dunn, 2004).  While these 
studies are highly instructive, it is important to remember that these effects are predicated on 
the assumption that a thin body is an ideal body.  However, research indicates that standards 
of beauty can vary among different racial/ethnic groups (see Overstreet, Quinn, & Agocha, 
2010), so thin media models may have a less negative emotional and psychological impact 
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on racial/ethnic groups that idealize heavier and curvier body types (see Botta, 2000; 
Schooler & Daniels, 2014). 
Media-based upward comparisons are also linked to intentions and overt health 
behaviors.  For instance, after upward comparisons to ideal media targets, women express an 
increased desire for invasive cosmetic surgeries and other procedures (Nabi, 2009; Markey & 
Markey, 2010), and stronger intentions to diet and exercise (Smeesters et al., 2010).  In terms 
of overt behavioral outcomes, upward comparisons to ideal media targets have been 
associated with women’s eating disorders (Botta, 1999; Harrison & Cantor, 1997), women’s 
restricted eating (Morrison et al., 2004; Smeesters, Mussweiler, & Mandel, 2010), men’s 
steroid use and dieting to gain weight, and pathogenic weight control for both genders 
(Morrison et al., 2004).  It is instructive to note that studies within the psychology literature 
reinforce the notion that social comparisons influence behavior in a variety of contexts 
beyond those that are purely health and body-oriented.  Such studies have found that 
comparisons contribute to differential consumer behavior, performance judgments, and 
helping or harming behavior (Karlsson, Garling, Dellgran, Klingander, & Klein, 2005; Lam, 
Van der Vegt, Walter, & Huang, 2011).   
Overall, there is ample evidence that media-stimulated comparisons contribute to 
behavioral and emotional responses.  While instructive, the aforementioned studies face five 
key limitations.  The first is that the wide array of potential emotional responses to media-
stimulated comparisons is not completely understood, as most past research has only 
explored general negative affect and body dissatisfaction.  Extant research generally assumes 
that negative affect or internalization of the thin ideal contribute to behavior change, but does 
not systematically explore the role of specific discrete emotions in differentially impacting 
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individuals’ behavior.  Thus, while past research has often considered emotional and 
behavioral outcomes to be separate effects, emotion and action are inextricably linked such 
that specific emotions lead to specific actions, as indicated by Nabi and Keblusek (2014), 
who found that envy and hope mediate the relationship between upward appearance-based 
comparisons and intent to undergo invasive cosmetic procedures.  To address this limitation, 
we measured subjects’ discrete emotional responses to a media program, and examined how 
different emotions contribute to different behaviors.   
The second limitation is that past studies generally measured behavioral intentions 
rather than overt eating behavior.  To address this gap, we included an overt eating measure.  
The third limitation of existing media and social comparison research is that studies tend to 
measure general comparison behavior without focusing on a particular target and domain of 
comparison.  Subjects were often shown images to induce comparisons in a short-term 
experimental setting, but subjects sometimes completed surveys of general trait-level 
comparison tendencies (see Dittmar & Howard, 2004; Jones, 2001).  This broad type of 
analysis ignores the fact that comparisons are highly character-specific—we consider 
ourselves better off than some characters, and worse off than others, and the comparison 
domains we choose depend on traits of the character in question at a particular moment in the 
program.  We addressed this important issue by measuring specific domains of comparison to 
a single media target over the course of a program.  The fourth limitation is that because past 
research tends to examine negative effects of ideal media models, it generally only explores 
emotional responses to upward comparisons, neglecting the prevalence of downward 
comparisons during media viewing and the resulting emotions and behaviors.  To address 
this limitation, we experimentally manipulated comparison direction.   
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The fifth and final key limitation is that past media research has typically only 
considered comparisons at one point in time due to short-term experimental and survey 
designs.  Those that have considered the role of time include content analyses revealing that 
television and magazine models of both genders have become increasingly thin in recent 
years, and males have become increasingly muscular (Garner, Garfinkel, Schwartz, & 
Thompson, 1980; Leit, Pope, & Gray, 2001; Schwartz & Andsager, 2011; Soulliere & Blaire, 
2006; Spitzer, Henderson, & Zivian, 1999), perhaps prompting more frequent or more 
threatening upward comparisons.  Acknowledging that psychological outcomes shift along 
with comparison direction over time, Zell and Alicke (2010) found that when individuals see 
that their performance is rising relative to others over time, they make more positive self-
evaluations than when their performance is falling or remaining constant.  Even when 
comparison direction remains constant, repeated exposure (and presumably comparisons) to 
ideal media models can have positive consequences such as increased body satisfaction by 
inducing viewers to engage in dieting behavior (Knobloch-Westerwick & Crane, 2012).  We 
addressed this issue by measuring social comparison behavior at different points in a 
television program.  The proliferation of popular transformational reality programs such as 
Extreme Weight Loss, Extreme Makeover, and What Not to Wear suggests that considering a 
temporal approach is particularly relevant for media scholars today.  To account for the 
reality that media characters frequently transform psychologically and physically, research 
on comparisons at different points in a program is needed.  A temporal approach is important 
because comparisons at different points in a program likely lead to different appraisals and 
hence different emotions and behavior.  Our repeated exposure to the same characters gives 
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us a chance to continuously gauge our performance against the performance of another, and 
comparisons shift as perceived relative status shifts.   
To systematically explore evolving comparisons to media targets that change over 
time, we chose to examine the context of a transformational weight loss reality program 
featuring a transitional character.  At the beginning of an education entertainment program 
(such as a weight loss program fostering pro-social, healthful behaviors), transitional 
characters are uncertain about engaging in the pro-social behavior being promoted (such as 
healthy diet and exercise behaviors).  These characters begin in a difficult life situation, 
realize that change is imperative, and then struggle to change their negative behaviors to 
more positive and desirable ones over the course of the narrative or program (Haider, 2005).   
Studying transitional characters is an ideal way to address several limitations of 
existing media research—particularly those limitations dealing with measurement and 
manipulation of social comparison behavior.  Utilizing programs featuring transitional 
characters is a relatively straightforward way of manipulating comparison direction, 
measuring specific comparison targets, and measuring comparisons at multiple points in 
time, as these programs tend to provoke downward comparisons to a character at one point in 
time, and upward comparisons to the same character at a later point in time, after the 
character’s transformation.  Thus, the proposed model of social comparison and affect will be 
tested in the context of a transformational reality program featuring a transitional character.   
Applying AMSC to the Reality Weight Loss Program Context 
As argued earlier, the AMSC model uses Lazarus’ (1991a) emotion typology to 
explain the crucial psychological link between specific comparison-induced emotions and 
action.  Testing the model in the context of a transformational weight loss reality program 
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(The Biggest Loser), we propose that viewers will compare downward to the pre-
transformation, overweight character at the beginning of the program.  We predict that 
comparisons will be made in both health domains (i.e. those dealing with fitness and 
attractiveness) and perseverance domains (i.e. those dealing with determination and positive 
attitude).  In contrast, we predict that viewers will compare upward to the newly slim, self 
confident, and healthy character at the end of the program (in both health and perseverance 
domains).  In line with Festinger (1954), it is expected that female undergraduate participants 
will engage in comparisons because the comparison target is similar to participants in terms 
of age and gender, and because we reason that the comparison domains of health and 
perseverance are self-relevant for most female undergraduate subjects.  Thus, we predict: 
H1a: Young women will make more downward comparisons to the female transitional 
character when viewing the beginning of the program relative to the ending.  
H1b: Young women will make more upward comparisons to the female transitional 
character when viewing the ending of the program relative to the beginning.  
Given that comparisons are predicted to shift over the course of the study, the AMSC 
model contains two branches—an upward comparison branch and a downward comparison 
branch (see Figure 2b).  Beginning our discussion with the upward branch, recall that upward 
comparisons can lead to a variety of emotions, including envy and hope.  The emotion felt is 
partly determined by one’s perceived attainability of becoming similar to the better off 
comparison target.  In line with psychological research on upward comparisons (i.e., 
Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Taylor & Lobel, 1989) and media effects research on upward 
comparisons (i.e., Morrison et al., 2004; Smeesters et al., 2010) we suggest that upward 
comparisons to a weight loss reality program contestant inspire personal improvement by 
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demonstrating that success is possible—in essence, such programs can foster perceptions of 
high attainability.  Thus, given that success in health domains is likely perceived as attainable 
(particularly for our relatively fit and healthy undergraduate sample), coping potential and 
future expectations are both likely favorable.  Based upon this pattern of appraisals, and in 
line with Nabi and Keblusek (2014), the model predicts that corrective emotions, such as 
envy and hope, are most likely following upward health-based comparisons to the media 
target in our study.   
Envy consists of desiring what someone else has (Lazarus, 1991a).  In a comparison 
context, this means longing for the success of an upward comparison target.  When envious, 
coping potential is favorable, as action meant to ameliorate the negative situation is possible.  
This action involves seeking out the object of one’s desire—in this case, success in health 
and perseverance-related comparison domains, obtained through self-improvement 
behaviors.  Envy is also associated with favorable future expectations, for envious 
individuals feel that the threatening situation can be improved, particularly if one engages in 
coping behaviors that enhance one’s comparative status in the target domain.  
 Hope also fits the aforementioned appraisal pattern.  Hope is defined as “fearing the 
worst but yearning for better” (Lazarus, 1991a, p.122).  When one feels hopeful he or she has 
experienced a setback (such as an unfavorable upward comparison) but believes that 
restorative action leading to the desired outcome is possible.  In this sense, coping potential is 
uncertain but somewhat favorable.  However, future expectations associated with hope are 
uncertain, as the hopeful individual is unsure of whether the current negative situation will 
improve in the future (Lazarus, 1991a), but remains optimistic that it will.  
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The downward comparison branch of the AMSC model follows a similar pattern. 
According to the social comparison literature, downward comparisons can lead to a plethora 
of emotions, including pride and happiness.  One’s perceived susceptibility of one day 
becoming similar to the worse-off comparison target shapes emotional responses to 
downward comparisons.  In the context of a reality weight loss program, there is likely a bias 
toward low susceptibility.  At the beginning of the show, the contestants are typically 
morbidly obese and facing severe health problems, which would likely not prompt the 
average viewer to perceive himself/herself as highly susceptible to becoming similarly heavy 
and unhealthy.  This is particularly likely for healthy undergraduate subjects who generally 
see themselves as invincible to harm.  Indeed, Elkind (1967) suggests that adolescent risk-
taking and perceived invincibility are a normal component of human psychological 
development, leading adolescents to fail to recognize that adverse consequences of risky 
behavior could befall them.  Thus, we believe that low susceptibility is primed in the weight 
loss reality program context.  In line with this, we reason that non-corrective emotions 
associated with low perceived susceptibility—and hence unnecessary coping potential and 
unnecessary or favorable future expectations—will likely be experienced after making 
downward comparisons to the program contestant.  These emotions include pride, happiness, 
and compassion.   
Pride consists of enhancing one’s ego by taking credit for a valued achievement 
(Lazarus, 1991a)—in this case, the achievement of relative success in terms of health and 
perseverance, as individuals are crediting themselves for their success in the downward 
comparison domain.  Coping potential is unnecessary because a proud individual is not 
experiencing a threat that needs to be addressed through coping behavior.  Future 
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expectations are unnecessary but somewhat positive, as no imminent threats to self-esteem 
are foreseeable.   
Happiness follows a similar appraisal pattern.  Happiness is defined as “making 
reasonable progress toward realization of a goal” (Lazarus, 1991a, p.122).  Presumably this 
can include making progress toward and eventually achieving the goal of success in the 
downward comparison domain.  Coping potential is unnecessary, as there are no situational 
threats to address.  To be happy we must have positive future expectations, or expectations 
that our success will continue (Lazarus, 1991a).   
Finally, compassion also fits the aforementioned appraisal pattern.  Lazarus (1991a) 
defines compassion as “being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help” (p.289).  In 
a social comparison context, this might involve being moved by the plight of a worse off 
comparison target.  As was the case for happiness and pride, coping potential is unnecessary 
because compassion is a generally positive emotion state with which we do not need to cope.  
Future expectations are somewhat positive insofar as individuals think that they will be 
praised for their kind deeds in the future (Lazarus, 1991a).  Sympathetic and compassionate 
individuals might recognize that they could become worse off one day, treating worse-off 
others as they would like to be treated if a similar fate ever befell them.  However, 
compassionate people ultimately remain somewhat detached from worse-off others, 
recognizing that they are better off than those they seek to assist.  
It is important to note that the coming hypotheses do not include all emotions that 
individuals can feel following upward and downward comparisons.  For the sake of 
simplicity, a few emotions have been selected because they seem particularly likely given 
past research, the specific media context chosen, and logical reasoning on perseverance and 
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health-based social comparisons.  Overall, the aforementioned discussion of comparisons and 
resulting emotions is summarized in the following hypotheses: 
H2: More upward comparisons will associate with greater arousal of corrective emotions, 
specifically envy and hope.  
H3: More downward comparisons will associate with greater arousal of non-corrective 
emotions, specifically pride, happiness, and compassion. 
In addition to social comparison direction and the resulting discrete emotions, another 
crucial component of the AMSC model is behavior.  Based on the social comparison 
literature, Lazarus’ theory, and Tesser’s SEM model, we suggest that upward comparisons 
are threatening and contribute to corrective emotions that drive us to want to engage in 
status-improving behaviors.  As the present study explores health and perseverance 
comparison domains, both are included in the following hypotheses: 
H4a: After making more upward health comparisons, health behavioral intent will increase. 
H4b: After making more upward perseverance comparisons, intent to persevere will 
increase.  
 While upward comparisons can inspire improvement in the comparison domain, we 
predict that downward comparisons do not have the same effect.  Because individuals are 
already comparatively better off, restorative action meant to ameliorate threat is unnecessary.  
We reason that favorable comparisons might provide an affective boost or feeling of 
superiority that leads to no change in behavioral intent:   
H5a: After making more downward health comparisons, health behavioral intent will remain 
unchanged. 
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H5b: After making more downward perseverance comparisons, intent to persevere will 
remain unchanged. 
Arguably the most important component of the AMSC model is the mediating role of 
emotion.  In line with Lazarus’ theorizing, the model poses that comparisons lead to specific 
emotions, and these emotions lead to behavioral intent and overt behavior.  Recall that 
corrective emotions are those for which coping potential is favorable and restorative action 
meant to return the threatened individual to a less-threatening, more goal-congruent state is 
possible.  Of the aforementioned emotions, envy and hope fit this classification, so I suggest 
that these are corrective emotions that motivate action following upward comparisons.  
Further supporting this notion, Lazarus (1991a) notes that envy and hope are both associated 
with action tendencies to seek the desired outcome or object.  Envy drives us to obtain what 
another person has (Lazarus, 1991), including superior fitness and attractiveness in the case 
of the present study.  Similarly, hope leads us to move toward the outcome we desire or wish 
for (Lazarus, 1991a).  Overall, we hypothesize that these so-called corrective emotions will 
mediate the relationship between upward comparisons and resulting behavioral intent.   
H6a: Corrective emotions, specifically envy and hope, will mediate the relationship between 
upward health comparisons and health behavioral intent. 
H6b: Corrective emotions, specifically envy and hope, will mediate the relationship between 
upward perseverance comparisons and intent to persevere.   
Recall that non-corrective emotions are those for which coping potential is deemed 
uncertain, unfavorable, or unnecessary.  For non-corrective emotions, restorative action 
meant to improve a threatening situation is deemed difficult, or preventative action meant to 
ameliorate potential future threat is unnecessary because the current situation is not 
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threatening.  Happiness, pride, and compassion all fit this criterion.  For these emotions, the 
motivation to act is low or nonexistent, so individuals experiencing them are unlikely to act 
to improve their relative status in the comparison domain.  Indeed, for the aforementioned 
emotions, coping potential is unnecessary because the current situation is positive and non-
threatening.  Further supporting this notion, Lazarus (1991a) generally defines the action 
tendencies of happiness, pride, and compassion as being drawn to others.  Pride leads 
individuals to boast about past success, happiness drives individuals to be outgoing, and 
compassion motivates us to help others in need (Lazarus, 1991a).  Thus, when we are 
experiencing these positive emotions we are prompted to share the positivity with those 
around us, but we are not moved to improve our already favorable standing in the 
comparison domain.  Given that downward comparisons are expected to yield emotions that 
are unlikely to impact behavior change, we do not pose a mediation hypothesis for downward 
comparisons. 
The hypotheses above involve behavioral intent, but the present study measures overt 
eating behavior as well.  We reason that eating will indeed be impacted by comparison 
behavior, such that those who compare upward eat less overall or simply choose to eat more 
healthy food and less unhealthy food when various options are presented.  While the 
cognitive-motivational-relational perspective suggests that downward comparisons will lead 
to no change in eating behavior because there is no immediate threat to address, we also want 
to see if downward comparisons will impact eating behavior such that those who compare 
downward will eat more overall, or will choose to consume more unhealthy foods because 
they are already comparatively better off so can “afford” to do so.  Extant research does not 
clearly predict one outcome over the other, so the following research questions are posed:  
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RQ1: Will individuals a) eat less after making upward health comparisons, or will they b) 
just eat more healthy food? 
RQ2: Will individuals a) eat more after making downward health comparisons, will they b) 
just eat more unhealthy food?  
Our third and final research question involves the potential mediating role of emotions in the 
relationship between social comparisons and overt eating behavior: 
RQ3: Do discrete emotions mediate the relationship between social comparisons and overt 
eating behavior? 
Method 
Design and Participants 
In the present experiment, comparison direction was manipulated through random 
assignment to one of four message conditions designed to stimulate different social 
comparison directions (described below).  Participants were a convenience sample of female 
undergraduate communication students at the University of California Santa Barbara.  
Participants were recruited from undergraduate communication courses and the study was 
posted on the Department of Communication’s research participation website, where 
interested students signed up to participate.  Participants received credit in their 
communication courses for their voluntary participation.  
Stimulus Materials 
To promote similarity (and hence comparisons) between the participant and 
comparison target, the experimental stimulus selected was Season 6 of The Biggest Loser, 
featuring the transformational journey of age-matched female contestant Michelle Aguilar, 
who lost 110 pounds and eventually won the contest.  In editing the program, other reality 
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show participants were removed from the clip as much as possible to ensure that Michelle 
was the target of comparisons.  This eliminated the problem of multiple social comparison 
targets contributing to different emotional and behavioral outcomes.  Commercials were also 
removed, as they could influence individuals’ emotions and prompt additional unwanted 
comparisons. 
The control stimulus selected was Life of Birds, a BBC nature program.  This 
stimulus was chosen because it is devoid of humans, so would not prompt social 
comparisons.  The program was also emotionally neutral (see results below).  Overall, then, 
the control program served as a thermometer of initial baseline affect and behavioral 
intentions against which the experimental (social comparison) treatments were assessed.  
Ultimately, four study conditions were created: beginning only (in which subjects watched a 
10-minute clip of the beginning of the season of The Biggest Loser), ending only (in which 
subjects watched a 10-minute clip of the end of the season of The Biggest Loser) beginning 
and ending condition (in which subjects watched both the 10-minute clip from the beginning 
of the season then the 10-minute clip from the end of the season of The Biggest Loser), and 
control (in which subjects watched Life of Birds).  
Procedure 
All participants came to the laboratory to complete the one-hour study, which 
included a total of 20 minutes of television viewing and approximately 40 minutes of 
questionnaires.  All videos appeared on the computer and all questionnaires were completed 
on the computer using Qualtrics software.  Students completed the study individually in 
isolated computer rooms.  Three bowls of snacks were pre-measured and placed in each 
cubby prior to participants’ arrival to the laboratory.  Research assistants mentioned to 
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subjects that because this was an hour-long study, snacks had been provided for their 
comfort.  
Subjects in all four conditions completed a 10-minute pretest questionnaire measuring 
demographics, height, weight, current health behavior, health behavioral intentions, body 
satisfaction, self-esteem, attainability, susceptibility, self-relevance and satisfaction in health 
and perseverance domains, and television viewing habits (descriptions of all measures 
follow).  After completing the questionnaire, subjects viewed the first stimulus video.   
Subjects in the beginning only, ending only, and control condition first watched a 10-
minute clip of Life of Birds, a nature show devoid of humans in which social comparison 
presumably would not occur.  Individuals in the beginning-and-ending condition viewed a 
10-minute clip featuring segments from the beginning of season 6 of The Biggest Loser.  
After this first exposure, subjects in all conditions completed the second 10-minute 
questionnaire on discrete emotions felt.  Participants in the beginning only, ending only, and 
beginning-and-ending conditions then viewed a 10-minute clip of The Biggest Loser.  Those 
in the beginning only condition viewed a 10-minute clip from the beginning of the season, 
whereas those in the ending only and the beginning-and-ending conditions viewed a 10-
minute clip from the end of the season.  Individuals in the control condition viewed another 
10-minute clip from the show Life of Birds. 
Finally, subjects completed a third questionnaire.  Individuals in the beginning only, 
ending only, and beginning-and-ending conditions (who just viewed a clip from The Biggest 
Loser) were asked about emotions felt, social comparison behavior, satisfaction in health and 
perseverance domains, behavioral intentions, attainability, susceptibility, body satisfaction, 
identification with the contestant, and reality TV viewing habits.  Those in the control 
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condition were asked all of the same questions, with the exception of identification and social 
comparison items.  After subjects left the laboratory, researchers used electronic scales to 
weigh the total amount of snacks remaining in each of the three snack bowls for each subject. 
Measures 
Current health behavior.  Weekly exercise and current health behavior were used as 
covariates in some analyses.  To assess weekly exercise, subjects were asked two open-ended 
questions: one regarding how many times per week they exercised, and the other regarding 
the duration (in minutes) of each bout of exercise (M = 221.64, SD = 222.49).  Responses on 
these two items were multiplied to create the scaled weekly exercise variable.  To assess 
current health behavior, subjects’ responses to five questions measured on a seven-point 
scale were averaged (α = .86, M = 3.95, SD = 1.25).  Sample items included: “How healthy 
were your eating habits in the past week?” (1 = Extremely unhealthy, 7 = Extremely healthy), 
“Overall, I believe that I get enough exercise,” and “Overall, I believe that I have healthy 
eating habits” (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).  
Behavioral intentions.  Posttest measures of behavioral intent were used to test 
hypotheses regarding the impact of social comparison direction and resulting emotions on 
subsequent intent to act, and pretest measures of behavioral intent were included as 
covariates in some analyses.  Two domains of behavioral intent were measured, specifically a 
health domain including items involving exercise and healthy eating habits, and a 
perseverance domain including items involving positive attitude and 
determination/perseverance.  Six behavioral intention scales were created: general pretest, 
health pretest, perseverance pretest, general posttest, health posttest, and perseverance 
posttest behavioral intentions.  What we call “general” behavioral intent includes items from 
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both the health and perseverance domains.  To create a scale of general pre- and posttest 
behavioral intentions, responses on eight seven-point Likert scale items were averaged 
(pretest general α = .85, M = 5.64, SD = .77, posttest general α= .87, M = 5.76, SD = .75).  
Items included: “I intend to exercise more in the next week,” “I intend to eat healthier in the 
next week,” “In the next week, I would like to adopt a more positive attitude,” and “In the 
next week, I would like to work harder toward my goals.”  
Pre- and posttest health behavioral intent was measured by averaging responses to 
four intent items dealing with exercise and healthy eating.  Sample items included: “I intend 
to exercise more/eat healthier in the next week” and “In the next week, I would like to 
exercise more/eat healthier” (pretest health α = .85, M = 5.41, SD = 1.01, posttest health α = 
.86, M = 5.64, SD = .933).   
Pre- and posttest intent to persevere was measured by averaging responses to four 
intent items dealing with positive attitude and determination/perseverance.  Sample items 
included: “I intend to work toward a more positive attitude in the next week,” “I intend to 
work harder to meet my goals in the next week,” and “In the next week, I would like to adopt 
a more positive attitude/work harder toward my goals” (pretest perseverance α = .84, M = 
5.87, SD = .80, posttest perseverance α = .89, M = 5.87, SD = .83).  
Body satisfaction.  Pretest body satisfaction was used as a covariate in some 
analyses.  It was measured using averaged scores on eight items from the body dissatisfaction 
subscale of the Eating Disorder Inventory (Garner, Olmstead, & Polivy, 1983).  This 
subscale accurately and validly operationalizes body-related behaviors and attitudes (Garner, 
1983) without asking participants about clinical eating disorders, and has been successfully 
utilized by other researchers (Egbert & Belcher, 2012; Smeesters et al., 2010).  Eight items 
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on a six-point scale (1 = Never, 6 = Always) were taken from the subscale, including “I think 
my thighs are too large” (reverse coded), “I feel satisfied with the shape of my body,” and “I 
think that my hips are just the right size” (α = .87, M = 3.61, SD = 1.01).  
Satisfaction in comparison domains.  Two domains of satisfaction were measured: 
a health domain featuring items involving exercise and healthy eating habits, and a 
perseverance domain featuring items involving positive attitude and 
determination/perseverance.  The “general” domain includes items from both health and 
perseverance domains. General pretest satisfaction was included as a covariate in some 
analyses, and was measured by averaging responses from the following six Likert items on a 
seven-point scale: “I am satisfied with my current level of physical attractiveness/level of 
physical fitness/ degree of physical health/ eating habits/how positive my attitude is/how 
determined and persevering I am” (α = .82, M = 4.53, SD = 1.12).  
Domain self-relevance.  General self-relevance, examining the personal relevance of 
the health and perseverance comparison domains, was included as a covariate in some 
analyses.  It was measured in the pretest by averaging responses to eighteen seven-point 
Likert scale items, including: “My physical attractiveness is an important part of who I am,” 
“My physical fitness is an important part of who I am,” “My general health is an important 
part of who I am,” “My positive attitude helps define me as a person,” “My 
determination/perseverance helps define me as a person,” and “I take pride in my eating 
habits” (α = .88, M = 5.12, SD = .78).  
Attainability.  General pretest attainability of success in perseverance and health 
domains was included as a covariate in some analyses.  Perceived attainability was measured 
by averaging responses to six seven-point Likert questions, including: “My ideal degree of 
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physical fitness is something I can achieve” and “My ideal degree of 
determination/perseverance is something I can achieve” (α = .86, M = 5.94, SD = .85).   
Discrete emotions.  Discrete emotions were measured to test affect-related 
hypotheses.  Emotional arousal was measured twice for each subject using a 37-item 
modified emotion adjective checklist previously utilized by Nabi and Keblusek (2014).  The 
items were introduced as follows: “Please indicate how much you tended to feel each 
emotion listed below when you watched the video clip that was just shown” (0 = Not at all, 5 
= Extremely).  Emotions measured included: encouraged, anxious, excited, envious, 
ashamed, scared, distressed, embarrassed, happy, worried, repulsed, jealous, shocked, guilty, 
nervous, pity, frustrated, sad, upset, disgusted, inspired, disappointed, satisfied, angry, 
compassion, surprise, astonished, sympathetic, revolted, hopeful, contemplative, irritable, 
fear, contempt, relief, calm, and pride.   
Scores on groups of emotions that loaded together in factor analyses were averaged to 
create the following scaled emotion variables: envy (envious and jealous, α = .88, M = .73, 
SD = 1.08), happiness (happy and satisfied, α = .83, M = 1.91, SD = 1.37), compassion 
(compassion and sympathetic, α = .72, M = 1.55, SD = 1.12), and hope (inspired, hopeful, 
and encouraged, α = .94, M = 2.48, SD = 1.61).  Because no other emotions from the emotion 
checklist loaded with pride, the pride variable consisted of a single item (M = .87, SD = 
1.30).   
To test hypotheses involving emotion, additional emotion variables were computed 
for both the beginning and ending and the control condition such that the posttest 1 and 
posttest 2 emotion scores were averaged in the beginning-and-ending and control conditions 
to account for the fact that emotion was measured twice in these conditions for the same type 
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of programming.  For the beginning only and ending only conditions, only subjects’ 
responses to the second set of emotion questions were included in this variable, as subjects 
responded to the second set of emotion questions after viewing The Biggest Loser, the main 
program of interest.  
Social comparison frequency.  Six social comparison frequency scales were created 
to test comparison-related hypotheses.  These scales were also used as covariates in some 
analyses.  Frequency of general upward comparison was measured using the following seven 
items on a seven-point scale (1 = Never, 7 = Extremely often): “I thought about how I am 
generally worse off than Michelle,” “While watching, I thought about how I was worse off 
than Michelle in terms of attractiveness/fitness/general health/eating habits/positive 
attitude/determination and perseverance” (α= .87, M = 2.43, SD = 1.29).  Frequency of 
upward health comparisons was measured by averaging scores on four of the aforementioned 
items involving attractiveness, fitness, and health, such as: “While watching, I thought about 
how I was worse off than Michelle in terms of fitness/general health” (α = .87, M = 2.33, SD 
= 1.47).   Frequency of upward perseverance comparisons was measured by averaging 
scores on two of the aforementioned items involving positive attitude and 
determination/perseverance, such as: “While watching, I thought about how I was worse off 
than Michelle in terms of positive attitude/determination and perseverance” (α = .77, M = 
2.88, SD = 1.65).   
Frequency of general downward comparison was measured by averaging scores on 
seven items (1 = Never, 7 = Extremely often): “I thought about how I am generally better off 
than Michelle,” and “While watching, I thought about how I was better off than Michelle in 
terms of attractiveness/fitness/general health/eating habits/positive attitude/determination and 
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perseverance” (α = .88, M = 3.62, SD = 1.37).  Frequency of downward health comparisons 
was measured by averaging scores on four of the aforementioned items dealing with fitness, 
such as: “While watching, I thought about how I was better off than Michelle in terms of 
general health/eating habits” (α = .88, M = 3.76, SD = 1.52).  Finally, frequency of downward 
perseverance comparisons was measured by averaging scores on two of the aforementioned 
items dealing with positive attitude and determination/perseverance: “While watching, I 
thought about how I was better off than Michelle in terms of positive attitude/perseverance 
and determination” (α = .88, M = 3.18, SD = 1.71).  
Social comparison direction.  Six social comparison direction scales were created to 
test comparison-related hypotheses.  Some of these scales were also used as covariates in 
some analyses.  General downward comparison direction was measured by averaging scores 
on the following seven Likert items on a seven-point scale:  “Compared with Michelle, I am 
generally better off” and “Compared with Michelle, I am more attractive/fit/healthier/have 
healthier eating habits/have a more positive attitude/am more determined and persevering” (α 
= .89, M = 4.27, SD = 1.19).  Downward health comparison direction, or downward 
comparison in health domains, was measured by averaging scores on four of the 
aforementioned items dealing with attractiveness fitness, health, and eating habits:  
“Compared with Michelle, I am more attractive/fit/healthier/have healthier eating habits” (α 
= .88, M = 4.38, SD = 1.41).  Downward perseverance comparison direction, or downward 
comparison in perseverance domains, was measured by averaging scores those two 
aforementioned items dealing with positive attitude and determination/perseverance:  
“Compared with Michelle, I have a more positive attitude/am more determined and 
persevering” (α = .81, M = 3.90, SD = 1.31).   
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General upward comparison direction was measured by averaging scores on the 
following seven seven-point Likert items:  “Compared with Michelle, I am generally worse 
off” and “Compared with Michelle, I am less attractive/less fit/less healthy/have less healthy 
eating habits/have a less positive attitude/am less determined and persevering” (α = .90, M = 
3.04, SD = 1.21).  Upward health comparison direction, or upward comparison direction in 
health domains, was measured by averaging scores on four of the aforementioned items 
dealing with attractiveness fitness, health, and eating habits:  “Compared with Michelle, I am 
less attractive/less fit/less healthy/have less healthy eating habits” (α = .89, M = 3.01, SD = 
1.35).  Upward perseverance comparison direction, or upward comparison direction in 
perseverance domains, was measured by averaging scores on the two aforementioned items 
involving positive attitude and determination/perseverance:  “Compared with Michelle, I 
have a less positive attitude/am less determined and persevering” (α = .85, M = 3.25, SD = 
1.51).   
Overt eating behavior.  Overt eating was measured using four variables (almonds 
consumed, M&Ms consumed, Goldfish consumed, and total food consumed) to explore 
research questions involving eating behavior.  To record food consumption, researchers 
measured the total amount of almonds, M&Ms, and Goldfish remaining in each of the three 
snack bowls after the subject’s time in the laboratory.  Amount of food consumed (in ounces) 
was subtracted from amount of food in the bowls at the beginning of the study (1 ounce 
almonds, 1.5 ounces M&Ms, and 1.1 ounces Goldfish—a serving size of each snack) to 
calculate how much of each snack was consumed during the study (almonds M = .27, SD = 
.34, M&Ms M = .37, SD = .46, Goldfish M = .37, SD = .40).  Consumption of the three 
snacks was summed to calculate total amount of food consumed (M = 1.01, SD = .98).  
 	  
37 
In addition to all of the aforementioned items, the questionnaires also included a 
variety of items regarding demographics (age, year in school, race, etc.), height and weight 
(to calculate body mass index), transformational reality TV viewing habits, and exercise-
related reality TV viewing habits to distract participants from the purpose of the study and to 
serve as covariates in statistical analyses.  Items were pretested by research assistants prior to 
the launch of the study to assure that they were clear, comprehensible, and unbiased.  
Pilot test   
A pilot test was conducted to answer the following three questions: (1) Were 
comparison manipulations effective? Specifically, did subjects compare downward when 
viewing the beginning of the program and upward when viewing the ending? (2) Could 
comparison instruction enhance subjects’ degree of social comparison? and (3) Were the 
control videos emotionally neutral?  In other words, were the control videos appropriate 
controls?  
The pilot study was a 2 (instruction/no instruction) x2 (beginning only/ending only) 
experimental design.  In instruction conditions, participants were told: “while watching, think 
about how you compare to Michelle, the character in the program.”  Those in beginning only 
conditions watched a clip from the beginning of a season of The Biggest Loser, whereas 
those in the ending only conditions watched a clip from the ending of a season of the 
program.  Immediately afterward, they answered questionnaire items regarding their social 
comparisons and emotional arousal.  Subjects then watched the nature clip (Life of Birds) and 
answered items regarding their emotional responses to that clip.  Participants consisted of 80 
female undergraduate Communication students at the University of California Santa Barbara.  
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To answer the first question regarding whether experimental condition impacted 
comparison direction, an ANOVA of general downward comparison frequency by condition 
was computed.  Analyses revealed a significant main effect of condition, F (3, 134) = 28.97, 
p < .001.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that those in the beginning only condition (M = 
4.64, SD = .83) compared downward significantly more frequently than those in both the 
ending only condition (M = 3.69, SD = .88, p < .001) and the ending only with instruction 
condition (M = 3.35, SD = .83, p < .001).  This suggests that the beginning only video was 
effective in eliciting downward comparisons.  Next, an ANOVA of general upward 
comparison by condition was computed.  Analyses revealed a significant main effect of 
condition, F (3, 134) = 3.03, p = .032.  Pairwise contrasts indicated that those in the ending 
only with instruction condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.62) were significantly more likely to 
compare upward than both those in the beginning only condition (M = 2.21, SD = 1.22, p = 
.02) and those in the beginning only with instruction condition (M = 2.15, SD = 1.02, p = 
.008).  This confirms that the ending only video is a successful upward comparison 
manipulation, particularly when paired with comparison instructions.  Indeed, the pairwise 
comparison between the ending only (M = 2.44, SD = 1.38) and beginning only condition 
was not significant (p = .48), nor was the comparison between the ending only and beginning 
only with instruction condition (p = .37).  However, simple means were in the expected 
direction, with those in the ending only groups reporting more upward comparison on 
average than those in the beginning only groups.   
To see if instruction enhanced frequency of social comparison, a 2 (instruction/no 
instruction) x 2 (beginning/ending) ANOVA with frequency of general comparison as the 
dependent variable was computed.  Results indicated that instruction did not significantly 
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influence social comparison frequency (p = .32).  Similarly, program condition did not 
significantly influence comparison frequency (p = .37), nor did the interaction between 
instruction and program condition (p = .64).  Although the mean differences are not 
significant, simple means generally indicate that subjects who received instructions 
compared more frequently (beginning with instruction: M = 4.27, SD = .83, ending with 
instruction: M = 4.33, SD = .76) than those who did not receive instructions (beginning 
without instruction: M = 4.05, SD = 1.02, ending without instruction: M = 4.25, SD = .85).  
This suggests that comparison instructions may help boost comparison behavior.  Due to this 
finding, comparison instructions were provided to subjects (except for those in the control 
condition) in the main study. 
Last, to answer the third question regarding the emotional neutrality of the control 
video, we examined mean emotional arousal scores across all four experimental conditions.  
Subjects reported more calmness than any other emotion after watching the control video.  
Further, subjects reported more feelings of calmness after watching the control video (M = 
2.67, SD = 1.74) rather than after watching the experimental videos (M = 2.23, SD = 1.44).  
A paired samples t-test indicated that the difference between these means was significant 
(t(137)= -2.45, p = .016, 95% CI from -.80 to -.09).  Thus the control video appeared to be 
relatively emotionally neutral and calming relative to the experimental video.  
Indeed, for thirty of the other emotions measured, arousal was greater following the 
experimental rather than control video, indicating that the control video was less emotionally 
arousing than the experimental videos on average (mean emotion scores for the control video 
were all between .01 and 2.67, whereas mean emotion scores for the experimental videos 
were all between .17 and 3.54).  This indicated that, as desired, the control video was 
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relatively emotionally neutral—presumably, it would not color emotional responses to future 
video clips.  Overall, pilot testing indicated that stimulus materials were appropriate for the 
main study.  
Results 
All analyses were conducted using ANOVAs, ANCOVAs, partial correlations, and 
the Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping macro INDIRECT.  For each hypothesis, 
covariates were selected based upon their correlating significantly with the variables of 
interest.  For the partial correlations, covariates were retained if significant in subsequent 
regressions.  For the ANCOVAs, covariates were retained if they were significant in the 
omnibus ANCOVA.  All covariates were significant at p < .05.  
H1: Comparison direction by experimental condition 
H1a: Downward comparisons when watching the beginning of the program.  
H1a predicted that individuals would engage in more downward comparisons when viewing 
the beginning versus the end of the program.  An ANCOVA with frequency of general 
downward comparison as the depended variable revealed a significant main effect of 
experimental condition, F (2,148) = 18.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .20 (controlling on initial general 
satisfaction).  As predicted, those who viewed the beginning of the program (M = 4.39, SD = 
1.24) reported more frequent general downward comparisons than those who viewed either 
the ending of the program (M = 2.99, SD = 1.24, p < .001) or both the beginning and ending 
of the program (M = 3.51, SD = 1.28, p < .001).  In line with our expectations and further 
supporting H1a, those who watched both the beginning and ending of the program reported 
significantly more frequent general downward comparisons than those who viewed the 
ending only (p = .02).  
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 A similar pattern of results emerged for downward health comparisons.  Frequency of 
downward health comparisons differed significantly by experimental condition, F (2,144) = 
16.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .19 (controlling on initial general satisfaction).  In line with our 
expectations, those who watched the beginning of the program (M = 4.60, SD = 1.24) 
compared downward in health domains significantly more frequently than those who 
watched both the beginning and ending of the program (M = 3.65, SD = 1.45, p < .001) and 
more frequently than those who watched the ending only (M = 3.07, SD = 1.47, p < .001).  
Further, in line with our expectations, those who watched the ending of the program reported 
significantly fewer downward health comparisons than those who viewed both the beginning 
and ending of the program (p = .028).  This supports H1 for health comparisons.  
Finally, an ANOVA revealed that frequency of downward perseverance comparisons 
differed significantly by experimental condition F (2,147) = 5.63, p = .004, ηp2 = .07.  As 
expected, those who viewed the beginning of the program (M = 3.77, SD = 1.97) made 
significantly more frequent downward perseverance comparisons relative to those who 
viewed the ending only (M = 2.65, SD = 1.53, p = .001).  Counter to our expectations, those 
who watched both the beginning and ending of the program did not make any more or less 
frequent downward perseverance comparisons than those who watched the ending only (p = 
.15).  However, in line with our expectations, those who saw the beginning only made more 
frequent downward perseverance comparisons than those who viewed both the beginning and 
ending of the program, as this contrast was borderline significant (p = .06).  Additionally, 
mean differences were in the expected direction, with those who saw the beginning making 
the most frequent downward perseverance comparisons, followed by those who saw both the 
beginning and ending of the program (M = 3.13, SD = 1.44), then those who saw the ending 
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of the program.  Overall, these results lend further support to H1a for downward 
perseverance comparisons (see Table 1).   
H1b: Upward comparisons when watching the ending of the program.  H1b 
predicted that subjects would make more upward comparisons when viewing the end versus 
the beginning of the program.  An ANCOVA revealed that general upward comparison 
frequency varied significantly by experimental condition F (2,148) = 12.86, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.15 (controlling on initial general satisfaction).  As expected, subjects reported significantly 
more frequent general upward comparisons when watching the end of the program (M = 
2.78, SD = 1.43) versus the beginning of the program (M = 1.81, SD = .97, p < .001. See 
Table 2).  Also as expected, subjects reported significantly more frequent general upward 
comparisons when viewing both the beginning and ending of the program (M = 2.67, SD = 
1.23, p < .001) versus the beginning only.  These results support H1b.  
This pattern of results also held for upward comparisons in health domains.  An 
ANCOVA with frequency of upward health comparisons as the dependent variable revealed 
a main effect of experimental condition, F (2,147) = 10.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .12 (controlling on 
year in school and initial general satisfaction).  As expected, subjects made significantly 
more frequent upward health comparisons while viewing the ending of the program (M = 
2.75, SD = 1.65) versus the beginning of the program (M = 1.68, SD = 1.22, p < .001), and 
while viewing both the beginning and ending of the program (M = 2.54, SD = 1.34) rather 
than just the beginning (p = .001).   
Turning to perseverance domains, an ANCOVA indicated that frequency of upward 
perseverance comparisons differed significantly by experimental condition, F (2,148) = 6.50, 
p = .002, ηp2 = .08 (controlling on initial general satisfaction).  In line with our expectations, 
 	  
43 
subjects reported significantly more frequent upward perseverance comparisons when 
viewing the end of the program (M = 3.12, SD = 1.75) versus the beginning of the program 
(M = 2.30, SD = 1.29, p = .002).  Also as expected, subjects made significantly more frequent 
upward perseverance comparisons when viewing both the beginning and the end of the 
program (M = 3.16, SD = 1.75) versus the beginning only (p = .002).  Overall, H1b is 
supported. 
H2: Emotions resulting from upward comparisons  
H2 predicted that upward comparisons would associate with greater arousal of envy 
and hope.  Envy was positively and significantly correlated with frequency of general upward 
comparisons, rp (147) = .41, p < .001 (controlling on BMI, initial general satisfaction, and 
frequency of general downward comparisons) as well as with frequency of upward health 
comparisons, rp (146) = .35, p < .001 (controlling on BMI, initial general satisfaction, year in 
school, and frequency of general downward comparisons) and frequency of upward 
perseverance comparisons, rp (147)= .36, p < .001 (controlling on BMI, initial general 
satisfaction, and frequency of general downward comparisons, see Table 3).  This supports 
H2. 
ANCOVAs examining emotional arousal across conditions further support these 
findings. An ANCOVA with envy arousal as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of 
experimental condition, F (3,196) = 12.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .16 (controlling on BMI, initial 
body satisfaction, and initial general satisfaction).  As expected, those who viewed the end of 
the program reported significantly more envy (M = 1.27, SD = 1.44) than those who viewed 
the beginning of the program (M = .36, SD = .72, p < .001).  Also as expected, those who 
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watched both the beginning and ending of the program (M = 1.01, SD = 1.01) reported 
significantly more envy than those who watched the beginning only (p < .001, see Table 4). 
Turning to hope, a partial correlation between hope and frequency of general upward 
comparison was positive and significant, rp (146) = .29, p < .001 (all analyses in this 
paragraph utilized most or all of the following covariates: initial behavioral intent, initial 
body satisfaction, initial general satisfaction, year in school, and frequency of general 
downward comparisons).  The partial correlation between hope and frequency of upward 
health comparisons was also positive and significant, rp (147) = .22, p = .006, as was the 
association between hope and frequency of upward perseverance comparisons, rp (146) = .24, 
p = .003 (see Table 3).  Thus, H2 is supported.   
ANCOVA analyses involving hope arousal by experimental condition further support 
to these findings.  As expected, there was a significant main effect of experimental condition 
on hope arousal, F (3,198) = 94.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .58 (controlling on initial behavioral 
intent and initial body satisfaction).  As expected, those who watched the ending of the 
program (M = 3.38, SD = 1.10) reported significantly more hope than those who watched the 
beginning of the program (M = 2.94, SD = 1.30, p = .03, see Table 4).  This lends further 
support to H2.   
H3: Emotions resulting from downward comparisons   
H3 predicted that more frequent downward comparisons would associate with greater 
arousal of pride, happiness, and compassion.  Counter to our expectations, pride was not 
significantly correlated with more frequent general downward comparisons, rp (147) = .14, p 
= .10 (controlling on initial general satisfaction and frequency of general upward 
comparisons) nor was it significantly associated with more frequent downward health 
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comparisons, rp (145) = .13, p = .13 (controlling on frequency of general upward 
comparisons).  However, as expected, pride was positively and significantly associated with 
more frequent downward perseverance comparisons, rp (146) = .20, p = .01 (controlling on 
frequency of general upward comparisons, see Table 3).   
In an ANOVA examining pride arousal by experimental condition, a significant main 
effect was found, F (3,199) = 14.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .18.  Counter to our expectations, those 
who watched the end of the program (M = 1.26, SD = 1.59) reported significantly more pride 
than those who watched the beginning of the program (M = .68, SD = 1.10, p = .02).  Also 
counter to our expectations, those who watched both the beginning and ending of the 
program (M = 1.47, SD = 1.36) reported significantly more pride than those who watched 
only the beginning of the program (p = .001, see Table 4).  These results do not support H3, 
which would predict that those who view the beginning of the program experience the most 
pride, and those who view the ending of the program would experience the least, with those 
viewing both the beginning and ending of the program somewhere in between.  
Like pride, happiness also was not significantly associated with frequency of general 
downward comparisons, rp (147) = .07, p = .40 (controlling on transformational reality TV 
viewing, initial general satisfaction, and frequency of general upward comparisons) nor did it 
associate with frequency of downward health comparisons, rp (145) = .08, p = .34 
(controlling on transformational reality TV viewing and frequency of general upward 
comparisons) or with frequency of downward perseverance comparisons, rp (146) = .08, p = 
.36 (same covariates as in the previous partial correlation, see Table 3).  This does not 
support H3.  
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 To further test H3, an ANCOVA with condition as the independent variable and 
happiness as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect for happiness, F 
(3,199) = 23.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .26 (controlling on transformational reality TV viewing).  
Counter to our expectations, however, those who viewed the end of the program (M = 2.64 
SD = 1.22) reported significantly more happiness than those who viewed the beginning of the 
program (M = 1.72, SD = 1.31, p < .001).  Further, subjects who viewed both the beginning 
and ending of the program (M = 2.41, SD = 1.09) reported significantly more happiness than 
those who viewed the beginning only (p = .003, see Table 4).  Overall, this pattern of results 
runs counter to H3.  
Finally, as expected, compassion was positively and significantly associated with 
more frequent general downward comparisons, rp (148) = .28, p < .001 (controlling on initial 
general satisfaction and frequency of general upward comparison) as well as with more 
frequent downward health comparisons, rp (146) = .32, p < .001 (controlling on frequency of 
general upward comparison), but was not significantly associated with more frequent 
downward perseverance comparisons, rp (147) = .08, p = .36 (same covariates as in the 
previous partial correlation, see Table 3).  These results provide mixed support for H3.  
To further test H3, an ANCOVA of compassion by condition revealed a main effect 
of experimental condition, F (3,197) = 26.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .29 (controlling on weekly 
exercise and exercise reality TV viewing).  In line with our expectations, those who viewed 
the beginning of the program (M = 2.28 SD = 1.06) reported significantly more compassion 
than those who viewed the end of the program (M = 1.48 SD = .99, p < .001), and those who 
viewed both the beginning and ending of the program (M = 1.86 SD = .95, p = .019, see 
Table 4).  This supports H3, suggesting that H3 is well supported for compassion, but not for 
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pride or happiness.  H3 is supported for compassion in general and health domains, for pride 
in perseverance domains, but not for happiness in any comparison domain. 
H4: Upward comparisons and behavioral intent 
Domains of social comparison help determine domains of subsequent behavior—for 
example, if we make health comparisons, resulting behavior would likely be in health 
domains rather than, say, intelligence or creativity domains.  Given the importance of domain 
specificity, the analyses below feature specific health comparison and perseverance 
comparison measures, rather than general measures of social comparison.  Similarly, these 
analyses include specific health intent and perseverance intent measures, rather than general 
measures of behavioral intent.   
H4a: Upward health comparisons and health behavioral intent.  H4a predicted 
that health behavioral intent would increase following more frequent upward health 
comparisons.  The partial correlation between frequency of upward health comparisons and 
posttest health behavioral intent was positive and significant, rp (144) = .18, p = .03 
(controlling on year in school, frequency of downward health comparisons, and initial 
general behavioral intentions), thus supporting H4a.  Additionally, an ANCOVA with 
condition as the independent variable and posttest health behavioral intent as the dependent 
variable approached significance, F (3, 197) = 2.26, p = .08 (controlling on age and initial 
general behavioral intentions).  Planned comparisons revealed that those who watched the 
ending of the program (M = 5.73, SD = .93) reported significantly higher posttest health 
behavioral intent than those in the control condition (M = 5.43, SD = 1.02, p = .01), as was 
predicted (p = .21).  Those who watched both the beginning and ending of the program (M = 
5.72, SD = .86) reported significantly higher health behavioral intent than those in the control 
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condition.  Finally, counter to our expectations, those who watched the beginning of the 
program (M = 5.70, SD = .91) reported higher health behavioral intent than those in the 
control condition, and this difference was borderline significant, p = .06.  Overall, while the 
contrasts are not all significant (non-significant p values range from p = .06 to p = .60), those 
who watched the beginning only, ending only, and both beginning and ending of the program 
reported higher health behavioral intent than those in the control condition, which is not 
precisely what was predicted.  Ultimately, support for H4a is mixed.  
H4b: Upward perseverance comparisons and intent to persevere.  H4b predicted 
that more frequent upward perseverance comparisons would lead to increased intent to 
persevere.  A partial correlation between frequency of upward perseverance comparison and 
posttest intent to persevere was not significant, rp (143) = .01, p = .93 (controlling on initial 
general satisfaction, frequency of downward perseverance comparisons, initial general 
behavioral intentions, and attainability).  Similarly, an ANCOVA did not reveal a significant 
main effect of condition on posttest intent to persevere, p = .47 (controlling on initial 
behavioral intentions and attainability).  None of the planned contrasts were significant 
(significance values ranged from p = .20 to p = .90).  Thus, H4b is not supported.   
H5: Downward comparisons and behavioral intent  
H5a: Downward health comparisons and health behavioral intent.  H5a predicted 
that subjects who engaged in more frequent downward health comparisons would experience 
no change in subsequent health behavioral intent.  A partial correlation between frequency of 
downward health comparisons and posttest health behavioral intent was positive and not 
significant, rp (145) = .13, p = .11, but its notable magnitude suggests that downward 
comparisons might motivate health behavior, which is the opposite of what was expected 
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(controlling on frequency of upward health comparisons and initial general behavioral 
intentions).  Recall from H4a that those who watched the beginning of the program (M = 
5.70, SD = .91) reported higher health behavioral intent than those in the control condition 
(M = 5.43, SD = 1.02), and this difference was borderline significant, p = .06.  This runs 
counter to our expectations.  Overall, H5a is not supported. 
H5b: Downward perseverance comparisons and intent to persevere.  H5b 
predicted that those who made more frequent downward perseverance comparisons would 
experience no change in subsequent intent to persevere.  In line with our expectations, the 
association between frequency of downward perseverance comparison and posttest intent to 
persevere was small in magnitude and not significant, rp (145) = .03, p = .76 (controlling on 
frequency of upward perseverance comparison, initial general behavioral intentions, and 
attainability).  Recall from H4b that an ANOVA of posttest perseverance intent by 
experimental condition was not significant (p = .47), nor were any of the contrasts. Thus, 
H5b is supported.   
H6: Mediating role of emotions following upward comparisons 
H6a: Mediating role of emotions following upward health comparisons.  H6a 
predicted that envy and hope would mediate the relationship between frequency of upward 
health comparisons and subsequent health behaviors (conceptualized as health behavioral 
intent).  To see if the data were suitable for mediation analyses, simple correlations between 
the potential mediators and health behavioral intent were computed.  The correlations were 
significant for both envy, r (202) = .20, p = .004 and hope, r (202) = .26, p < .001, suggesting 
that mediation analyses were appropriate.   
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Controlling on envy, the positive and once-significant relationship between frequency 
of upward health comparisons and posttest health behavioral intent, rp (144) = .18, p = .03 
(from H4a) remained positive and became non-significant rp (143) = .08, p = .36.  It also 
decreased substantially in magnitude, from .18 to .08, suggesting mediation and supporting 
H6a.  Controlling on hope, the positive and significant relationship between frequency of 
upward health comparisons and posttest health behavioral intent, rp (144) = .18, p = .03 (from 
H4a), was also rendered non-significant, rp (143) = .15, p = .06.  However, the association 
did not decrease substantially in magnitude, suggesting that hope is unlikely to be a mediator.  
We utilized the Preacher and Hayes (2008) INDIRECT macro for SPSS to further test 
H6a.  Bootstrapping with 5000 resamples confirmed the mediating role of envy, (95% CI 
from .004 to .10, controlling on frequency of downward health comparisons, year in school, 
and pretest general behavioral intent), suggesting that envy fully mediates the relationship 
between frequency of upward health comparisons and health behavioral intent.  Further 
confirming the mediating role of envy, the relationship between frequency of upward health 
comparisons and subsequent health behavioral intent was rendered non-significant and its 
magnitude was cut in half when controlling on envy (before controlling on envy: β = .08, p = 
.03, after controlling on envy: β = .04, p = .36, see Figure 3).  As to hope, bootstrapping was 
not significant, as the confidence interval included zero (95% CI from -.004 to .03, same 
covariates as the analysis above).  Thus, hope does not appear to be a mediator in this case.  
Overall, H6a was partially supported. 
H6b: Mediating role of emotions following upward perseverance comparisons.  
H6b predicted that envy and hope would mediate the relationship between frequency of 
upward comparisons in perseverance domains and subsequent intent to persevere.  To see if 
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the data were suitable for mediation analyses, simple correlations between the potential 
mediators and perseverance intent were computed.  The correlation was not significant for 
envy, r (202) = .04, p = .59, but it was significant for hope, r (202) = .18, p = .01, indicating 
that hope, but not envy, should be further tested for mediation.   
Partial correlation mediation analyses were not conducted, as all partial correlation 
between perseverance comparisons and posttest intent to persevere were not significant (p = 
.93, from H4b).  Bootstrapping analysis yielded a confidence interval including zero, 
confirming that envy is not a mediator, CI -.04 to .05 (controlling on frequency of downward 
perseverance comparisons, pretest general satisfaction, pretest general behavioral intent, and 
attainability).  As to hope, bootstrapping yielded a confidence interval from .001 to .06 (same 
covariates as in the analysis above).  This interval does not include zero, but the relationship 
between frequency of upward perseverance comparisons and posttest intent to persevere was 
non-significant in the model (p = .93), and this relationship decreased in magnitude (β = .004 
was reduced to β = -.02) but remained non-significant when including hope as a mediator (p 
= .64).  Given this, the analysis confirms that hope is an indirect mediator, which supports 
H6b.  Overall, H6b was partially supported. 
Research questions: Social comparisons and eating behavior 
RQ1:  Upward comparisons and eating.  RQ1 asked whether subjects would (a) 
consume less food overall after making upward health comparisons, or whether they would 
(b) choose to eat healthier foods overall.  Regarding total food consumed, the partial 
correlation between frequency of upward health comparison and total food consumed during 
the study was not significant, rp (143) = .07, p = .41 (controlling on year in school, frequency 
of downward health comparisons, and race).  Corroborating these results, an ANCOVA of 
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total food consumed during the study by experimental condition was not significant (p = .26, 
controlling on race).  Overall, this suggests that the total amount of food consumed does not 
vary by frequency of upward comparisons or experimental condition.  
 Next, we examined whether subjects eat more healthy foods following upward health 
comparisons.  Partial correlations indicate that more frequent upward health comparisons 
were positively and significantly associated with amount of almonds consumed, rp (143) = 
.17, p = .04 (controlling on year in school, race, and frequency of downward health 
comparisons), but not with amount of goldfish consumed, rp (144) = -.05, p = .53 (controlling 
on year, and frequency of downward health comparisons), or M&Ms consumed, rp (143) = 
.06, p = .48 (controlling on year, relevance, and frequency of downward health comparisons.  
See Table 5).  This supports the notion that frequent upward comparisons impact the type of 
food subjects choose to consume.  No ANCOVAs with food consumption as dependent 
variables revealed a significant effect of experimental condition, suggesting that condition 
did not have a significant impact on type of food consumed: for almonds, p = .18 (controlling 
on race), for goldfish, p = .12 (controlling on year in school), or for M&Ms, p = .39 
(controlling on self-relevance).   
RQ2: Downward comparisons and eating.  Correlations were used to examine 
whether those who frequently compared downward ate more overall.  The correlation 
between frequency of downward health comparison and total food consumed was positive 
but not significant, rp (144) = .03, p = .70 (controlling on frequency of upward health 
comparisons and race).  ANCOVA analyses did not lend support to the notion that downward 
comparisons impact total food consumption, either (an ANCOVA of total food consumed by 
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condition was not significant, p = .26, from RQ1).  Overall, it does not seem that comparison 
direction or frequency impact the total amount of food consumed during the study.  
 Next, we examined whether downward comparisons might impact the type of food 
that subjects elect to consume.  Partial correlations examining frequency of downward health 
comparisons and food consumption were not significant for almonds, rp (144) = -.12, p = .14 
(controlling on frequency of upward health comparisons and race), or Goldfish, rp (144) = 
.01, p = .88 (controlling on frequency of upward health comparisons and year in school), but 
a positive and borderline significant relationship was found for M&Ms, rp (144) = .16, p = 
.06 (controlling on self-relevance and frequency of upward health comparisons. See Table 5).  
Despite the fact that the ANCOVA in RQ1 examining M&M consumption by experimental 
condition was not significant (p = .39), this suggests that downward comparisons indeed 
impact the type of food one chooses to consume, as more downward health comparisons 
were associated with eating more M&Ms.  
 RQ3: Emotions mediating eating behavior.  RQ3 asked whether specific discrete 
emotions would mediate any identified relationships between social comparisons and 
subsequent eating behavior.  Recall from RQ1 that more frequent upward health comparisons 
were positively and significantly associated with amount of almonds consumed, rp (143) = 
.17, p = .04.  To see if the data were suitable for mediation analyses, simple correlations 
between the potential mediators and almond consumption were computed.  The correlation 
was significant for envy, r (201) = .16, p = .02, but not for hope, r (201) = .05, p = .50, 
indicating that envy should be explored as a potential mediator. 
Partial correlation mediation analyses indicated that when adding envy as a covariate, 
the aforementioned relationship between upward health comparisons and almonds consumed 
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was rendered non-significant, rp (142) = .11, p = .18.  Further, the correlation reduced a bit in 
magnitude, from .17 to .11, suggesting that envy might mediate the social comparison–
almond consumption relationship.  However, bootstrapping was not significant for envy, CI 
from -.01 to .04 (controlling on frequency of downward health comparisons, year in school, 
and race), as the confidence interval included zero.  This suggests that envy is not a mediator 
in the upward health comparison-almond consumption relationship.  
Recall from RQ2 that the partial correlation between frequency of downward health 
comparisons and M&Ms consumed was positive and borderline significant, rp (144) = .16, p 
= .06.  Thus, meditational analyses were conducted for the relationship between downward 
health comparisons and M&Ms consumption.  To see if the data were suitable for mediation 
analyses, correlations between the potential mediators and M&Ms consumption were 
computed.  The correlation was not significant for pride, r (200) = .07, p = .31, happiness, r 
(201) = -.03, p = .65, or compassion, r (201) = .03, p = .70.  Further analyses were not 
conducted, as none of the variables were suitable for meditational analyses.  
Discussion 
The goal of this research was to test the relationship between specific types of media-
stimulated comparisons and specific discrete emotions as well as the crucial link between 
comparison-induced emotions and health behaviors.  Ultimately, the primary goal of the 
study was to test the newly proposed Affect Model of Social Comparison (AMSC).  We 
found that, as predicted, different experimental conditions led to different comparison 
directions.  Also as predicted, upward comparisons in health and perseverance domains 
resulted in envy and hope.  Counter to our predictions, happiness was unrelated to downward 
comparison, and downward comparisons resulted in feelings of compassion and pride in only 
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certain comparison domains.  As predicted, frequency of upward health comparison was 
positively and significantly associated with health behavioral intent.  Frequency of downward 
health comparison was moderately associated with health behavioral intent as well, 
suggesting that, counter to our predictions, both upward and downward social comparisons 
can motivate behavior in certain contexts.  Neither frequency of downward nor upward 
perseverance-based comparison was related to intent to persevere, however.  In terms of 
overt eating, results indicated that frequency of upward health comparison was positively 
associated with almond consumption, and frequency of downward health comparison was 
associated with increased M&Ms consumption.  Mediation analyses revealed that envy fully 
mediates the upward health comparison-health behavioral intent relationship, whereas hope 
indirectly mediates the relationship between upward perseverance comparisons and intent to 
persevere.  In the coming section, I will address each of these key findings in turn. 
Media stimulus and comparison direction 
As predicted, we found that those who viewed a less desirable media model tended to 
make more downward comparisons to the character in the program, whereas those who 
viewed the same model in more desirable circumstances (e.g. after a physical transformation) 
tended to make more upward comparisons to the character, with those who viewed both 
depictions somewhere in between or indistinguishable from the ending only condition, 
suggesting a recency effect.  Thus, we have evidence that a transformational media figure can 
elicit both downward and upward comparisons over the course of a program, depending upon 
when these comparisons are made.  This finding is unique in comparison-based media effects 
research, as much of this research has only addressed upward comparisons to ideal media 
models (see Jones, 2001; Morrison, Kalin, & Morrison, 2004; Agliata & Tantleff-Dunn, 
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2004; Botta, 1999; Cattarin et al., 2000; Hawkins, Richards, Granley, & Stein, 2004; 
Tiggemann & McGill, 2004).  Given that media characters change and evolve over the 
course of a program or series, it makes sense that our comparisons can also shift.  While the 
results of the present study indicate that comparison directions can differ among those who 
view the beginning versus the end of the program, it seems possible that a single viewer can 
compare downward to a character before his or her transformation, and can later compare 
upward to the same character after the transformation.  Additionally, comparison directions 
could shift from upward to downward for characters whose plight worsens over the course of 
a program.  Future research should utilize within-subjects designs to explore this possibility, 
and to assess emotional and behavioral outcomes of shifting comparisons over time.  For 
example, perhaps initial downward comparisons would contribute to weaker effects of later 
upward comparisons to the same character due to residual arousal of non-corrective 
emotions, or perhaps we would see a recency effect such that the most recent comparisons 
and emotions experienced would have the strongest impact on behavior, regardless of the 
comparisons previously made and emotions previously experienced.  Alternatively, we might 
see that initial downward comparisons contribute to stronger behavioral effects of later 
upward comparisons to the same character because viewing the character’s complete 
transformation enables viewers to see the action steps they can take to improve their own 
lives, and shows them that success is indeed possible, boosting perceived attainability.  
Emotions resulting from social comparisons 
 As to the model testing, the prediction that specific comparison directions would lead 
to specific discrete emotions was supported for upward but not for downward comparisons.  
Indeed, those who made more frequent upward comparisons tended to feel more envy and 
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hope, regardless of the comparison domain.  However, results were more mixed for 
downward comparisons.  Indeed, many of the emotions we were predicting to result from 
downward comparisons actually often associated more with upward comparisons.  As 
expected, more frequent general downward comparisons and health-based downward 
comparisons were associated with more feelings of compassion, though perseverance-based 
downward comparisons were not associated with compassion.  Perhaps this is because 
viewers do not feel compassion toward those who are less persevering and have a less 
positive attitude than themselves—indeed, these individuals may be seen as whiny and 
complaining.  Instead, more frequent downward perseverance comparisons were associated 
with greater pride, perhaps because viewers felt good about themselves and their 
perseverance levels.   
Downward health comparisons were not associated with pride, perhaps because 
subjects interpreted pride as feeling proud of the character rather than proud of themselves.  
It is unlikely that subjects would be proud of the overweight character at the beginning of the 
program.  Finally, counter to our expectations, frequency of downward comparison was not 
associated with happiness arousal, regardless of the domain of comparison.  Perhaps this is 
because subjects interpreted happiness as feeling happy for the character rather than for 
oneself.  Subjects likely would not feel happy for the overweight character at the beginning 
of the program, which may have led to the low happiness and pride arousal in the beginning 
only condition.  The AMSC model was created under the assumption that the target of 
emotional arousal is a participant who is focusing on his or her own goals and feelings (for 
all emotions except compassion, which is inherently empathetic and other-directed).  
However, the does not hold when participants experience empathetic emotions wherein the 
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target of arousal is the media character, and participants feel happy for or proud of this 
character.  Given this, emotion should be measured more carefully in future studies, taking 
into account the target of the arousal.  Alternatively, it is also possible that the downward 
comparison branch of the AMSC model needs to be revisited, as the emotions predicted were 
not the ones that subjects felt following downward comparisons.  These results are 
instructive, however, for while most media research to date has found that social 
comparisons lead to general negative affect, the present experiment found that different types 
of comparisons are associated with specific emotions, both positive (i.e., compassion, pride, 
and hope) and negative (i.e., envy).  
Social comparison and behavioral intent 
As to social comparison and behavioral intent, as expected, frequency of upward 
comparisons in health domains positively and significantly associated with health behavioral 
intent.  However, ANCOVA analyses did not corroborate these results, perhaps because 
condition was not a perfect proxy for social comparison behavior.  Indeed, subjects made 
downward comparisons most often, even when viewing the ending of the program.  
ANCOVA analyses of the proportion of downward versus upward comparisons by condition 
indicated that, controlling on initial general satisfaction, subjects made significantly more 
downward comparisons than upward comparisons in all conditions (F (2,148) = 27.86, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .27).  The proportion of downward versus upward comparisons was highest in the 
beginning only condition (M = 2.57, SD = 1.77), followed by the whole program condition 
(M = .85, SD = 1.95), then the ending only condition (M = .21, SD = 2.04).  This finding 
makes sense in light of research suggesting that the pleasure of comparing downward is a 
fairly significant motivation for reality TV viewing among individuals who take pleasure in 
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the difficult life circumstances of those appearing on reality television programs (Nabi et al., 
2003).  Such individuals are likely to compare downward rather than upward regardless of 
the show’s content.  These results also make sense when considering that most of the 
experimental subjects were already quite fit and healthy (BMI M = 22.12, SD = 3.34, which 
is solidly in the “healthy weight” range).   
Downward comparisons were positively associated with posttest health behavioral 
intent, and the correlation, while not significant, was notable (rp (145) = .13).  In fact, the 
magnitude was quite similar to that of the upward comparison-health intent correlation (rp 
(144) = .18), indicating that, counter to our predictions, both upward and downward 
comparisons can motivate health behavior.  In general, results suggest that upward 
comparison matters as a motivator, but simple means indicated increased posttest health 
behavioral intent from all experimental conditions relative to the control, suggesting that the 
program may have had a general motivating influence on viewers’ health behavioral 
intentions regardless of comparison direction.  Perhaps downward comparison prompted 
health behavior change due to high perceived susceptibility of becoming worse off in the 
future—this is a question for future research to explore. 
The association between perseverance comparisons and perseverance intent were 
examined next.  The relationship between frequency of downward perseverance comparisons 
and perseverance intent was small and not significant (rp (145) = .03), suggesting that, in line 
with our predictions, downward comparisons do not alter individuals’ intent to persevere.  
This is likely because downward comparison contributes to arousal of non-corrective 
emotions that do not motivate individuals to change their behavior for better or worse.  
Nearly identical results were found for upward perseverance comparisons and perseverance 
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intent (rp (143) = .01), suggesting that the perseverance domain may simply be seen as more 
immutable and resistant to change and improvement than the health domain.  Indeed, it may 
be that the domain of comparison is more important in shaping health behaviors than the 
comparison direction. 
Social comparison and eating behavior 
In addition to increased behavioral intent, impacts on overt health behavior were also 
seen.  More frequent upward comparisons in health domains were significantly and 
positively associated with number of almonds consumed during the study.  Interestingly, 
those who made more frequent health-based upward comparisons opted to consume the 
healthiest snack option provided (almonds).  Further, those who made more downward 
comparisons in health domains opted to eat more of the least healthy snack option provided 
(M&Ms), suggesting that downward comparisons may lead to a “slacker” effect in which 
heath behavior actually declines due to feelings of perceived health superiority.  Individuals 
may feel that they can consume unhealthy food in the moment because they are already much 
healthier than the comparison target.  Future research should explore if these effects can 
persist in the long run, or if subjects will begin to eat healthier shortly after exposure to the 
worse off comparison target.  Ultimately, this finding highlights the potential power of media 
characters to influence not only viewers’ cognitions and feelings, but the specific types of 
food that they choose to consume.  
Emotions as mediators 
 As to meditational analyses, results support the AMSC model for health-based 
upward comparisons—those who made more frequent upward health comparisons felt more 
envy, and this envy, in turn, contributed to increased health behavioral intent (intent to 
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exercise and eat healthy).  This finding that envy is a mediator aligns nicely with Lazarus 
other emotion scholars’ notion that emotion drives action, reinforces our classification of 
envy as an approach or corrective emotion, and corroborates the results of Nabi and 
Keblusek (2014), who found that envy mediated the relationship between social comparison 
and desire for invasive cosmetic procedures.   
Hope was identified as an indirect mediator in the relationship between frequency of 
upward perseverance comparisons and intent to persevere, suggesting that comparison-
induced emotions can shape behavioral intentions in a variety of domains, ranging from the 
physical (i.e. exercise, healthy eating) to the psychological (i.e. determination, positive 
attitude).  These findings mirror Nabi and Keblusek (2014), who found that envy fully 
mediates the social comparison-behavior relationship, whereas hope is an indirect mediator 
that inspires improvement.  It may be the case that different corrective emotions drive action 
depending upon the comparison context.  In this study, feeling envious of another’s success 
drives health behavior change, whereas feeling hopeful that one’s personality (determination 
and perseverance) can change drives perseverance behavior change.  The motivating power 
of hope relates nicely to Dweck’s (2006) work on the fixed versus growth mindset—future 
research could benefit from considering viewers’ beliefs regarding the mutability or 
immutability of the comparison domain in question, and how that influences intent to change 
one’s behaviors.  
Given these findings, producers of media messages seeking to promote healthful 
behaviors should consider messages featuring characters that are not overly thin, but still 
somewhat better off than audience members in the relevant health domains being espoused 
(i.e., fitness, eating habits, etc.) to inspire feelings of envy, which drive action meant to 
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improve one’s relative status.   It is important to note, however, that there may be significant 
psychological costs associated with envy, including lowered self-esteem and increased 
hostility (Smith & Kim, 2007).  Future research should explore the relative costs and benefits 
of envy to see if envy arousal is indeed a practical behavior change strategy.  To inspire 
feelings of hope that also drive audience members to improvement-oriented action, producers 
might also consider featuring characters similar to audience members whose success seems 
somewhat attainable.  
Strengths and shortcomings of the AMSC model 
The AMSC model was not entirely supported for downward comparisons, as 
downward comparisons were not associated with all of the emotions in the model.  Further, 
the model was not well supported for perseverance-related domains (i.e. intent to work 
harder toward one’s goals and to adopt a more positive attitude).  This may be because 
perseverance domains are seen as more immutable and resistant to change, and questions 
such as “I intend to adopt a more positive attitude in the future” may have been difficult for 
subjects to interpret.  Finally, mediation models were not well supported for overt eating 
behavior.  Perhaps this is because the laboratory environment may have been seen as an 
uncomfortable place to eat, so our results may not accurately reflect naturalistic eating 
behavior.  Ultimately, however, results suggest that the AMSC model at least partially 
reflects the role of media-stimulated upward comparisons and emotion in contributing to 
behavioral intent.    
The Affect Model of Social Comparison is the first media effects model to unite 
social comparison theorizing and research with Lazarus’ (1991a, 1991b) discrete emotion 
typology and his cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion, and it explains the 
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specific mechanism through which comparisons induce behaviors.  This is theoretically and 
practically important because it allows researchers and producers of media messages to better 
understand how health messages can spur or deter health behavior, depending upon specific 
psychological characteristics of audience members.  Ultimately, this study helps demonstrate 
the importance of examining specific domains of comparison, as effects may be found in 
some domains but not others.  Finally, the study shows that different directions of 
comparison contribute to distinct emotional and behavioral outcomes.  Future research 
should continue to explore emotions and behaviors resulting from different comparison 
directions and domains.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The present study is not without limitations.  One significant limitation involves 
ecological validity.  We recognize that the laboratory environment does not reflect the 
everyday television viewing experience, particularly in that participants do not select their 
own media content and may be paying closer attention to the program than they normally 
would, which could limit generalizability.  Further, scenes from the program have been 
edited and taken out of context in the present study, so future research should adopt a more 
naturalistic approach using unedited shows as stimulus materials.  Future studies should 
specify the target of arousal when measuring emotion (asking “I feel happy for myself” 
versus “I feel happy for the character”) and should use more sophisticated eating measures, 
providing subjects with a wider variety of snack options and video recording food 
consumption.  
Future research should also examine the behavioral and psychological effects of 
different types of  “transformational” reality shows, and would benefit from within-subjects 
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designs to more closely examine temporal effects.  Subsequent experiments could also 
manipulate perceptions of attainability and susceptibility, and could explore other positive 
behavioral outcomes resulting from social comparisons to media targets, such as motivation 
to achieve intellectually and socially.  It seems plausible that different types of media-
stimulated comparisons could contribute to a plethora of pro-social behaviors, such as 
increased time spent developing healthy relationships, doing homework, or honing important 
skills (athletic, musical, etc.).  Future research should examine the notion that while media 
depictions could promote demoralization or inaction, they might also inspire viewers to 
improve their lives in a variety of ways.  While the AMSC model was designed to apply to 
health behaviors, it could be expanded to include other types of pro-social outcomes resulting 
from different discrete emotions.  Ultimately, the newly proposed AMSC model helps us to 
systematically predict health behaviors and behavioral intent from media-stimulated 
comparison direction and discrete emotions experienced, rendering it a novel and useful 
contribution to the media effects literature.  The model demonstrates that our connections to 
media characters can influence our emotions and behaviors in significant ways, and it can 
pave the way for much novel exploration into media, social comparison, affect, and behavior 
change. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Lazarus’ (1991a) Discrete Emotion Typology, including appraisals of goal 
congruency, coping potential and future expectation, as well as action tendencies.  Note that 
hope and compassion are deemed “problematic” in terms of goal congruency, as they are 
somewhat “positive” emotions arising out of goal-incongruent situations for the self (in the 
case of hope) or for others (in the case of compassion). Emotions included in hypotheses are 
bolded.   
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Figure 2a. The full Affect Model of Social Comparison (AMSC), containing four main 
branches: upward comparison with high attainability, upward comparison with low 
attainability, downward comparison with high susceptibility, and downward comparison with 
low susceptibility.   
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Figure 2b. The condensed Affect Model of Social Comparison (AMSC), tested in the present 
study. Discrete emotions mediate the social comparison-behavior relationship in both health 
and perseverance domains. 
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Envy mediating the relationship between upward comparison and health behavioral    
intent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency of upward health-
based comparisons 
Health behavioral intent 
Envy 
.35*** .12** 
Figure 3. ***p < .001, **p < .01 or p = .01, *p < .05 
.04 
(.08*) 
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  Table 1.  
 
Frequency of Downward Comparison by Condition 
	   	  Frequency of General Downward 
Comparison  
Beginning 
Only 
Ending 
Only 
Beginning 
and Ending 
M* 4.39 a 2.99 b 3.51 c  
SD (1.24) (1.24) (1.28) 
Frequency of Downward Health 
Comparison  
Beginning 
Only 
Ending 
Only 
Beginning 
and Ending 
M* 4.6 a 3.07 b 3.65 c 
SD (1.24) (1.47) (1.45) 
Frequency of Downward Perseverance 
Comparison 
Beginning 
Only 
Ending 
Only 
Beginning 
and Ending 
M* 3.77 a 2.65 b 3.13 a, b 
SD (1.97) (1.53) (1.44) 
*  Means between conditions differ p < .05. Subscripts that differ within rows are 
significantly different at p < .05. See manuscript for covariates utilized in each analysis.  
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Table 2. 
Frequency of Upward Comparison by Condition 
	   	  
Frequency of General Upward Comparison  Beginning Only 
Ending 
Only 
Beginning 
and Ending 
M* 1.81 a 2.78 b 2.67 b 
SD (0.97) (1.43) (1.23) 
Frequency of Upward Health Comparison  Beginning Only 
Ending 
Only 
Beginning 
and Ending 
M* 1.68 a 2.75 b 2.54 b 
SD (1.22) (1.65) (1.34) 
Frequency of Upward Perseverance 
Comparison 
Beginning 
Only 
Ending 
Only 
Beginning 
and Ending 
M* 2.3 a 3.12 b 3.16 b 
SD (1.29) (1.75) (1.75) 
*  Means between conditions differ p < .05. Subscripts that differ within rows are 
significantly different at p < .05. See manuscript for covariates utilized in each analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
 	  
79 
 
Table 4. 
 
Emotional Arousal by Condition 
 
Envy Beginning Only Ending Only Beginning and Ending Control 
M* 0.36 a 1.27 b 1.01 b 0.29 a 
SD (0.72) (1.44) (1.01) (0.71) 
Hope Beginning Only Ending Only Beginning and Ending Control 
M* 2.94 a 3.38 b 3.18 a, b 0.43 c 
SD (1.3) (1.1) (1.13) (0.69) 
Pride Beginning Only Ending Only Beginning and Ending Control 
M* 0.68 a 1.26 b 1.47 b 0.05 c 
SD (1.1) (1.59) (1.36) (0.23) 
Happiness Beginning Only Ending Only Beginning and Ending Control 
M* 1.72 a 2.64 b 2.41 b 0.86 c 
SD (1.31) (1.22) (1.09) (1.12) 
Compassion Beginning Only Ending Only Beginning and Ending Control 
M* 2.28 a 1.48 b 1.86 b 0.61 c 
SD (1.06) (0.99) (0.95) (0.74) 
*  Means between conditions differ p < .05. Subscripts that differ within rows are 
significantly different at p < .05. See manuscript for covariates utilized in each analysis.  
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Table 5. 
Correlations Between Frequency of Health Comparisons and Food Consumption 
Comparison Frequency Total Food Almonds  Goldfish      M&Ms  
Upward (health) 0.07 .17* -.05 0.06  
Downward (health) 0.03 -.12 0.01 .16†   
Note. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .00. See manuscript for covariates included in each analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
